Dangerous Ground

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A Terrorist Sanctuary
The federally administered tribal Areas, which include Mehsud's South Waziristan base but not Swat, have always been Pakistan's Wild West, a lawless frontier land notorious for smugglers, thieves, guns and drugs. The FATA, as the area is called, is a legacy of a 19th century agreement between the British rulers of undivided India and the Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous fringes of the Empire. In exchange for autonomy and the freedom to run their affairs in accordance with their Islamic faith and customs, the tribal leaders promised to guard the border with Afghanistan and keep peace in the region. At independence in 1947, Pakistan kept the agreement. The army stayed out. In place of government, Pakistan adopted a set of administrative and legal measures called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) that forces the tribes to take collective responsibility for the actions of their members. Justice follows the tribal code and is meted out by clan elders who consult in public gatherings called jirgas. It was an imperfect solution to a difficult problem. But when al-Qaeda leaders fled Afghanistan in the wake of the 2001 war on their Taliban hosts and took refuge in the tribal areas, it became downright dangerous.

In May CIA Director Michael Hayden called the FATA an al-Qaeda "safe haven" that presents a "clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular." Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, says, "If I were going to pick the next attack to hit the United States, it would come out of FATA." Intelligence officials in the region, and abroad, say that al-Qaeda operatives, taking advantage of the limited reach of government, have been able to set up sophisticated communications systems, financial networks and training facilities. Al-Qaeda "has hundreds of training camps" scattered throughout the FATA, says a Western official in Pakistan with access to intelligence reports. "Most are less than an acre in size, so they are difficult to detect."

To Khalid Aziz, a onetime political agent appointed by Islamabad to administer to the tribal areas, the militancy is an obvious outcome of the antiquated agreement. Development that brought schools, jobs, roads, health care and electricity to the rest of Pakistan largely bypassed the tribal areas. Unemployment among the population of 3.5 million hovers around 70%. Two-thirds live below the poverty line. Only 6% of inhabitants can read. For women it's less than 1%. "Given that kind of environment; it's not likely that you will see a Leonardo da Vinci come up," says Aziz, who now heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training in Peshawar. "You'll get an Osama or one of his clones instead." Aziz welcomes the U.S. Administration's promise of $750 million to provide economic development in the area but says it is not enough. "What we need are jobs."

Most FATA people want development, but not at the expense of their traditional ways. Shari'a law is the foundation of their justice system and few will willingly give it up. Rather than a wholesale elimination of the FCR, there should be a gradual transition, says Haider Mullick, a former Brookings analyst. "It's not rocket science. It's sitting down with them and saying, O.K., here are 100 things that are different from how we operate in Islamabad. We will concede on some of these issues. But there are going to be some no-nos on our side, and some on yours. For example, no public stoning of women — that's out of the question. In turn we will ensure that no soldier can walk in and search your house and strip you naked and beat you up.' There needs to be a give and take on each side."

A Helping Hand
Democrats in the U.S. senate have proposed a $7 billion aid package to Pakistan, including a "democracy dividend" of $1 billion, over the next four years to help the civilian government with education reform, health care and infrastructure. It's a welcome move, but opening up the U.S. market to Pakistani products such as textiles would provide a longer-term — and taint-free — solution. The chorus among businessmen and analysts across the country is "trade, not aid." The U.S. presence in Pakistan, particularly in the FATA, is viewed with suspicion. American Predator drone attacks on apparent al-Qaeda targets have claimed scores of civilian lives, and the Pakistani military presence in the FATA is seen to be at the behest of the U.S. "There is so much resentment in our blood now that even if you give us candy, we will think it is poison," says Malik Sherzada, a school principal in Bajaur, which has been the site of one such Predator attack.

If Washington really wants to help Pakistan, its policies must move beyond Musharraf and the military and give the people a higher priority. Seth Jones, a terrorism expert at the Rand Corp., says that Pakistan has become the neglected stepchild, only third or fourth in a list of U.S. strategic interests that start with Iraq and Afghanistan. "Pakistan should be No. 1," says Jones. "The most serious homeland threat to the United States from abroad comes from militant groups operating in Pakistan."

This is Pakistan's war to win, and the best way the U.S. can help is by letting it fight on its own terms. But the new government can only do that if the two parties in the coalition work together. They must remember that the true enemy is not Musharraf or the military or their political opponents, but poverty, extremism and injustice.