FLYING INTO TROUBLE

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So when I decided in 1995 that we should repeat our security audit, I expected that most of the more obvious breaches would prove to have been corrected. We decided to put particular emphasis on bomb detection this time. But I was bitterly disappointed: in 1995 my agents, together with FAA inspectors, carried fake bombs--strapped to their bodies or in briefcases with marzipan candy or other substances arrayed on boards to look like plastic explosives--and guns and knives through metal detectors. They got into secure areas at the big international airports around the country. They were not stopped 40% of the time.

Early in the summer of 1996, I gathered up the final report on airport security and headed toward the FAA administrator's office. I wasn't looking forward to this meeting. The FAA didn't like me, and had never liked my reports, and if I had missed that message, a fresh signal had just been sent. Secretary Pena had been scheduled to come to this meeting. But then his office must have discovered that the latest airport report was not substantially different from the 1993 study. So he bowed out. The message seemed clear. The Secretary was seeking Washington's best protection--deniability. Pena didn't want to know about the security report. Since I insisted on discussing it, the Secretary had apparently decided not to hear me. Instead, he left it to the FAA administrator.

Hinson's demeanor was familiar: he was his usual easygoing self. I expected the FAA staff and the Secretary's underlings not to like our findings, but I wasn't prepared for the real point of our meeting: they wanted me to bury the report. The Olympic Games were opening in Atlanta that month. The investigation might have miserable results, but "the threat is low," they kept repeating. What good would it do to upset the public and generate a lot of negative publicity right before the Olympics? I couldn't say an attack was imminent. Still, I knew that the number of attempted bombings had skyrocketed in recent years.

The FAA did try to get airports to do a better job at screening. In January 1996 it warned airline and airport managers at major airports across the country that there were serious problems not only with airline screening processes but also with the airports' security procedures. For example, O'Hare was in 16th place among 19 big international airports. The FAA said its people watched 1,500 bags go through checkpoints, and saw only one opened for closer inspection.

I contended that the security report was so important that not only should it be released immediately, it should be delivered directly to the President. But mine was the minority opinion in that office that day. The FAA, with the backing of the Secretary of Transportation, agreed to send a copy of the document to the National Security Adviser but remained convinced it was best to withhold the report from the public indefinitely. dot officials insisted that I hold the report; they were requesting that the document be classified.

ENOUGH WAS ENOUGH