FLYING INTO TROUBLE

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Spurred by the gruesome deaths and public outrage, FAA inspectors examined ValuJet's own books and discovered so many egregious violations that the carrier was grounded within weeks--on June 17. The resulting consent order between ValuJet and the FAA listed 34 violations going back three years, breaching every type of regulation.ValuJet agreed not to fight its grounding and paid $2 million toward the FAA's cost of reinspecting planes. It was not a penalty; in fact, the airline bought itself a virtually clean slate. "The FAA agrees that, except for violations of regulations concerning hazardous materials and civil aviation security," the consent order said, "it will not pursue any civil penalty for any violation of the regulations known by FAA as of the date and time of the execution of this agreement." How could it? The FAA could hardly go back and find the faults without admitting that it was to blame for missing or ignoring them in the first place.

Yet I knew the FAA was to blame; my senior staff agreed, and Congress had heard from us that this was the case. And we knew ValuJet was not alone. Shoddy inspections were an FAA plague. Exposing them had occupied me since my first year on the job.

LIFE WITH THE TOOTHLESS ENFORCER

The FAA is responsible for certifying and then continually examining aircraft design, airline operations, airplanes, pilots, mechanics, repair stations, aircraft parts--essentially every stage of commercial aviation. The agency does this with one basic tool: inspections. The nearly 3,000 FAA inspectors are the main link between the government and the airlines, and it is their job to make sure the carriers operate within the law. They are supposed to stay on top of the airlines, verifying that planes and pilots are in shape to fly. It's a hands-on job, one that pays from $40,000 to $70,000 a year. To do their work properly, inspectors should follow detailed checklists and keep up on training. But most of all, they need motivation, a sharp, diligent eye--and impartiality.

In 1992, Schiavo's office investigated seven of the FAA regions and found trouble.

Inspectors did an abysmal job of examining the nation's aircraft operators. Countless required or recommended inspections were never conducted, while others were carried out so perfunctorily that they were meaningless, and still more revealed problems that went unreported just to spare the airlines any inconvenience. Inspections of planes, pilots, mechanics and repair stations were so unreliable as to be virtually useless. Fortunately, most of the time savvy and diligent airlines filled the gap. But it was inevitable that the inspection process would eventually break down at an airline like ValuJet, creating the perfect conditions for a deadly crash.

The numbers were stunning: from 1988 to 1990, 833,000 inspections turned up fewer than 4,000 violations. The inspectors issued few warnings or fines and rarely tracked cases or followed up on inspections. Landing gear, oxygen systems and engine controls were checked in less than half the inspections. The engines were inspected only 52% of the time. Yet the FAA insisted it completed thousands of inspections every year. How many were thorough? And what about those that were not completed?