FLYING INTO TROUBLE

(9 of 16)

We knew inspections were haphazard, but some of the examples were simply ludicrous. In 1995 Delta Airlines planes underwent nearly 13,000 inspections--but received only seven violations. The inspectors rarely did the paperwork necessary to follow up on the few problems they uncovered.

Between 1990 and 1996, my office issued 10 reports, all of them critical, on the FAA's inspection system--of aircraft operators, parts manufacturers, repair stations, designated mechanic examiners. Every investigation or audit was a battle, accomplished only after crafting strategies to outwit the FAA. My office made 70 recommendations to intensify FAA inspections. The NTSB weighed in too, pointing out that a 1988 crash that killed 12 people might not have happened if the FAA had been more meticulous in inspecting the airline and its pilots. Unfortunately, slipshod review of aircraft is the norm, not the exception.

OUR SEARCH FOR BOGUS PARTS

In my first months as Inspector General, I learned that my predecessors had made only occasional forays to review just how the FAA inspected parts manufacturers and suppliers. The FAA was satisfied with the procedures in place for monitoring parts makers and brokers. But I couldn't help noticing the reports that crossed my desk: allegations about fraudulent aircraft parts were more numerous than ever, aging aircraft fleets still needed replacement parts that their manufacturers no longer made, more and more parts makers were foreign operations, the number of parts brokers and distributors was increasing every year, and the price of parts was skyrocketing. Still, the FAA continued to assume that most parts were properly manufactured and safe. This last alarmed me: if the opportunity existed for making and selling counterfeit parts with little FAA oversight, then the chances of getting caught were slim. How could an unscrupulous manufacturer or broker pass up odds like that?

In 1991 the FAA got only a few hundred reports of bogus parts. Nevertheless, I knew each report could represent thousands of parts. The number of brokers, on the other hand, is unknown. The FAA says 2,000 to 5,000; some aviation-industry estimates put the number at 20,000. Nobody knows, because brokers are unlicensed, unregistered, untrained--and ungoverned by the FAA. They are the broken link in the FAA's regulatory chain. We found that bad brokers would simply close up shop, move to another building or town, and resume business under a new name.

We would seize bad parts from almost every kind of aircraft: helicopter blades, brake components, engines, engine starters, fuel bladders, generators, bearings, speed drives, avionics, cockpit warning lights, landing gears, wheels, combustion liners, parts of helicopter tail rotors, windshields and entire wing and tail assemblies. We would confiscate parts made in basements, garages and weld shops, or from major U.S. manufacturers and from Germany, France, England, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, China, the Philippines, Taiwan or unknown countries. They even showed up on the President's helicopters and in the oxygen and fire-extinguishing systems of Air Force One and Two.