The Central Front

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Zardari not only has to overcome suspicions about his past but also will have to unify his fractured nation at a time of great trauma. Other than party loyalists, few believe he can. "The jury is out on redemption," says political analyst Nasim Zehra. "But I don't think Zardari can stand up and rally the people behind him." Zardari has to balance U.S. demands for firm military action against the distrust of a public alienated by American adventures in the region. In a country where most blame the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan for Pakistan's problems, he will have to convince Pakistanis that the war on terrorism is their war too.

That will not be easy. Zardari became President without ever having to face a popular vote (the President is chosen by parliament, which is currently dominated by his party), and he assumes an office bloated with powers bequeathed by his dictatorial predecessor. The constitution, as amended by Musharraf, grants Zardari immunity from prosecution and enables him to choose--and dismiss--the Chief of Army Staff, personally select Supreme Court judges and dissolve parliament. Under Pakistan's original constitution, these powers belonged to the elected members of parliament; the President was supposed to be a neutral national leader. With few democratic credentials, Zardari, like Musharraf, has absolute power with no mandate. He has said that "parliament is sovereign, and the President would be subservient to the house of the people's representatives," but the relief that announcement brought will count for little if he gets tagged as Washington's man, particularly if he retains powers that many believe are unconstitutional. "Musharraf was seen as America's puppet, and now with Zardari, people think it's the same continuation of policies," says Sherpao. "It would be better for him, and for America, if he just stands in the background and gives advice to the Prime Minister."

In the process of consolidating power, Zardari burned bridges, including a valuable alliance with Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League--N, that promised, for once, a functioning national government unhindered by destabilizing rivalries. Zardari's reversal of a promise to reinstate judges dismissed by Musharraf last fall led Sharif's party to drop out of the coalition government, taking with it the highly regarded Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar. The economy, already burdened by skyrocketing food and oil prices, collapsed, and there was a run on the stock market, which had been one of the best-performing in Asia.

The rift over the judges may be only a precursor. Many fear that Zardari's and Sharif's parties will revert to the vicious infighting that plagued Pakistan in the late 1980s and '90s. That was bad enough, but Pakistan has nuclear weapons now, and al-Qaeda is still picnicking in its backyard. The military, headed by General Ashfaq Kayani, has promised to stay out of politics, but if the situation deteriorates, it may be forced to intervene. "I don't think [Kayani] will let the country come apart," says Anthony Zinni, a retired four-star Marine general who from 1997 to 2000 headed the U.S. Central Command. "He and the army are watching the Sharif-Zardari business with a lot of worry."

Careful What You Wish For

Pakistan's troubles may not be solvable by the men in uniform. "With the insurgency in the tribal areas, the situation has become much more complex," says career diplomat Humayun Khan. "The military may try to step in, but it may not succeed." Pakistan today, he says, "has all the ingredients of a revolution: poverty, injustice, instability, alienation, religious fervor and an incompetent government. If the parties don't work together to solve these problems, there is a real danger that the government fails completely."

Though Pakistan has lost several thousand soldiers in the war against the Islamic insurgency, many U.S. lawmakers believe it is not doing enough. Western military leaders in Afghanistan have accused the ISI of actively supporting the terrorist groups that are behind attacks on foreign forces and civilian targets, such as a suicide blast at the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 54. Zardari will have to rein in the ISI and work with the Americans to minimize collateral damage from attacks on militants inside Pakistan. Most difficult of all, he will have to convince his populace that such attacks benefit Pakistan as much as the U.S.

Whatever the military challenges, the U.S. Administration has continued its quiet cultivation of Kayani, who has acted more aggressively against insurgents in recent months, with full-scale aerial assaults. On Aug. 6 he launched a massive operation in Bajaur tribal agency, an insurgent-ridden area along the border. But the exercise was a lesson in being careful what you wish for. Pakistan's army was built to fight a conventional war with India and is ill equipped to handle violence at home. Three weeks of air strikes forced more than 260,000 residents to flee the region; many ended up in squalid camps. They have turned their wrath on the government, not on the militants who are fighting it. "We are sandwiched between security forces and the Taliban," says Fazl Sadiq, 30, who is staying in a camp. He claims that the air strikes have killed more civilians than militants. "If the government does not halt its indiscriminate killing, then one day I will also join the Taliban to take revenge."

Will anything work? "The military has pursued two bad policies in the tribal areas--appeasement and excessive use of force," says Samina Ahmed, South Asia project director for the International Crisis Group. "Either way, all they have achieved is empowering the militants, helping them in recruitment and in obtaining funding." She laments the lack of a coherent strategy. "Militaries are blunt instruments; they are not good at counterinsurgency," she says. "The police would be a far more effective instrument, but there is no coordination between the military and the civilian government, so political reform and economic development--essential elements to any counterinsurgency--are not part of the equation."

A long-term effort to quell extremism in the tribal areas will require even more. Pakistan needs to bring schools, jobs, roads, health care, courts and the rule of law to a populace that has rarely seen government attention. Unemployment among the population of 3.5 million hovers around 70%. Two-thirds live in poverty. Only 6% of its people can read, and for women, the figure is less than 1%. Yet neither Pakistan nor the U.S. appears to have a comprehensive strategy for the area. A top expert on Pakistan recently visited a colleague at the White House who, the expert says, was embarrassed to admit that "no matter who wins the election, I don't have a U.S. policy toward Pakistan to give them."