Asia's Dithering Democracies

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Engaging the Electorate
Asia may be home to three-fifths of the world's population, but not a single election over the past decade has produced a leader able to build broad-based support for decisive policy choices. Why is this? One answer lies in a fundamental difference in the way Asians regard their rulers. Although the Asian Barometer Project found that the majority of Asians say they support most democratic ideals, their commitment to limits on a leader's power is far lower than that of people polled in Europe or even sub-Saharan Africa. In South Korea, for instance, nearly two-thirds of those surveyed believed that a morally upright ruler could be given carte blanche to do whatever he wants, even if that means breaking the law.

This ruler-knows-best attitude can make Asians act more like subjects than citizens. Militaries — the other power pole in much of Asia — can meddle in politics without much public distress from the masses. Just look at how Bangkok office ladies cheerily handed carnations to the soldiers who carried out a 2006 coup against Thailand's democratically elected leader. When Asians finally do react against their governments, it is often in extremis, anger spilling onto the streets in revolutionary-style rallies.

The impulse is understandable. Beginning in the mid-1980s, a wave of people-power revolutions transformed the continent, from the Philippines and South Korea to Thailand and Taiwan. But such mass protests were designed to overthrow dictators, not democratically elected leaders. In much of Asia, political frameworks now exist to remove incompetent rulers at the ballot box, making street rallies to throw the bums out largely unnecessary. Of course, no electoral system is perfect: vote-buying in villages, for instance, plagues some Asian countries. But it is only by going through several electoral cycles that democracies can consolidate and grow.

To an extent, the lack of trust in elections is a consequence of inadequate political education. For frustrated farmers or construction workers or street vendors, it may be easier to imagine political change through a groundswell of antigovernment rallies rather than through checking one of many underwhelming candidates on a ballot. Asia's education systems, largely underfunded and over-reliant on rote learning, do little to instruct citizens on the power of franchise or the importance of accountable leadership. Still, as Thais — even those who initially supported the PAD protesters — realized, months of street demonstrations are not pleasant. The protest movement may have gotten what it wanted, but the country now faces a likely economic recession because foreign investors and tourists are spooked by the political instability.

Building Checks and Balances
Traditional Asian deference makes it easier for one party to keep a stranglehold on politics, its power feeding on itself and undermining real opposition. Malaysia and Singapore have each been controlled by one party since independence, while the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominates Japan. "The LDP has been in power for more than 50 years," says Arne Fahje, a constitutional expert in Tokyo. "That doesn't work in a democracy, and it's not good for the country."

Other countries are blighted by dynastic democracy, in which the same families — the Bhutto-Zardaris in Pakistan, say — act as if it is their birthright to lead, and the electorate duly votes them in. Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines have all elected daughters of former leaders to helm their countries, while the man who's set to assume the top post in Malaysia in March is the son of a former Prime Minister. In Japan, the current premier is the grandson and son-in-law of ex-premiers, while his two immediate predecessors were the son and grandson of Prime Ministers respectively.

Unless voters learn to identify rulers beyond a family crest or party symbol, the region's leadership crisis will only feed the historical assumption that Asians are somehow ill-equipped to handle democracy. John Stuart Mill, whose writings helped gird modern democratic principles, dismissed the Indians living under British rule as "barbarian," perhaps better suited to despotic rule. The colonial assumption was that Asians were somehow not civilized enough to handle democracy.

Newly independent nations took on the white man's burden, however, and surpassed their former overlords' expectations. The target of Mill's doubt, India — with some 3,000 castes, 22 official languages and at least 10 distinct faiths — is the world's most populous democracy, despite the efforts of insurgents and religious extremists to derail it. Indeed, in the aftermath of the recent Mumbai terror attacks, the city did not erupt in sectarian riots as some had feared it would. Back in 1949, B.R. Ambedkar, the low-caste architect of India's constitution, called democracy "topdressing on Indian soil." Yet today, Mayawati Kumari, a member of a Dalit, or untouchable, caste is one of the nation's biggest political stars — albeit one with a penchant for accepting lavish gifts. "The fact that a leader like Mayawati can rise, that a Dalit woman can have a shot at becoming the Prime Minister of India," says historian Ramachandra Guha, "is a matter of pride for Indian democracy." Too few other Asian nations can be so proud.

Shoring Up Institutions
Asia's propensity for voting in a big man (or woman) has stifled the growth of independent institutions that should check the power of elected leaders. Often, the media is muzzled, if not silenced outright. In 2007, at least 17 journalists were killed in Asia for doing their job, while in Pakistan alone 250 reporters were detained by security forces, according to media watchdog Reporters Without Borders. "Pakistan's inability to institute a democratic political system stems from the failure to build institutions that can moderate conflict," says Ayesha Jalal, a historian at Tufts University in Massachusetts, who specializes in South Asian politics.

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