How to Bring Change to the Kingdom

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Abdullah began shaking the Kingdom out of its petroleum hangover by declaring in 1998 that the "boom is over and will not return — all of us must get used to a different lifestyle." As an alternative to the easy oil riches, Abdullah has spearheaded the most significant attempt at economic restructuring in the Kingdom's history, opening negotiations with American and other Western energy powers on a $100 billion foreign investment project to develop natural gas and build related electricity and desalination plants. Still, oil accounts for around 70% of the country's revenues.

Abdullah has slashed government budgets, barring new military spending and scaling back white elephants like the Strategic Storage Program, an estimated $25 billion project designed to supply the Saudi armed forces with jet fuel in case some invader happens to occupy Saudi refineries. Earlier this month, he warned bureaucrats that they faced dismissal if they didn't shape up, a far cry from the glory days when every graduate was assured a government desk and a paycheck, work or no work. The 30,000-strong royal family weren't spared the belt-tightening: no more ignoring telephone and utility bills, he decreed, or treating the national carrier Saudia like a private airline.

Since Sept. 11, Abdullah has sent clear signals — albeit in the quiet, gradual Saudi way — that Saudis must get their heads out of the sand and become part of the global village. One after another, he called in groups of Saudi imams, teachers, journalists and businessmen and warned them against taking Saudi Arabia's puritanical brand of religion, known as Wahhabism, to unacceptable extremes. Though not to Washington's complete satisfaction, Abdullah began tightening up on potential terrorist financing, scrutinizing Islamic charities and freezing some suspect bank accounts — an explosive issue in a culture that fiercely guards privacy. At a recent Gulf Cooperation Council meeting, Abdullah told Arabs to stop blaming others and review their own faults.

In 1999, Abdullah became an overnight hit with Saudi women when he pointedly declared that the country would "open all doors" for them to play greater roles in society. Recently, the government began issuing identity cards to women for the first time.

Abdullah's straight talk doesn't go down well with everyone. His relations with Washington soured last year as he vented his personal anger with the Bush Administration. Because of Abdullah's belief that Bush was ignoring the Palestinian issue, about which he feels passionate as an ardent Arab nationalist, he had turned down invitations to visit Washington, including one handwritten by Bush himself. Then, while watching a live press conference on TV one day in August, Abdullah became furious at the way the President, he felt, was putting all the blame for the spiraling violence on Yasser Arafat and none on Israel. He instructed Saudi Ambassador to Washington Prince Bandar to deliver a stark message: relations were at a crossroads, and Saudi Arabia would now look after its own interests, thank you.

Bush assuaged Abdullah's concerns, but Sept. 11 raised tensions anew. U.S. grumbling about a lack of Saudi cooperation in the war on terrorism quickly escalated into calls in Congress for Washington to consider reducing its presence at the Prince Sultan Air Base (P-SAB in military jargon), where the U.S. has 6,000 Air Force personnel patrolling Iraqi skies. The problem was initial Saudi hesitation in allowing the Pentagon to use a new U.S.-built command-and-control center at P-SAB to conduct the drive against bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. Known as the Combined Air Operations Center, or CAOC, the vast underground facility is manned with 300 specialists and equipped with satellite receivers, computers and secret communications. It enables commanders to direct a major war with real-time feedback on progress and setbacks. The Saudis relented, and the U.S. use of CAOC for Afghanistan has been an open secret since the war began in October.