Buy! (I Need the Bonus)

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That hasn't been the case for a decade. As early as 1991, analysts at Furman Selz (now part of ING) recall having to pass muster with investment bankers during job interviews. Bankers, who held veto power over analyst hires, pressed applicants on their willingness to work with bankers. "You had to be willing to compromise, or you were out," says a former Furman Selz employee. By 1996 analysts at some large firms were going on new-business pitches with investment bankers, crossing the line dividing salespeople and bankers, which had been sacrosanct. By then star analysts were getting as much as 75% of their compensation from the banking side of the firm. One can well imagine they cared more about wooing banking clients than about putting Grandpa in a winning stock.

In a 1999 memo, Merrill's Blodget outlined a weekly schedule that had him spending 85% of his time on banking and 15% on stock research. Many analysts had investment-banking bonuses written into their contracts. In an interview with FORTUNE last year, Mary Meeker, the analyst at Morgan Stanley who was dubbed "queen of the Net" for her connections in Silicon Valley, spoke freely of her interest in ipos and investment banking. A 1999 Wall Street Journal article reported that star technology banker Frank Quattrone at Credit Suisse First Boston enjoyed "unusual autonomy," which included tech analysts' reporting directly to him. CSFB has since removed that autonomy and any investment-banking kickers from analyst contracts.

The real crime, securities lawyers say, is that while the problems were well documented, regulators did nothing until investors had lost billions of dollars. Only since Spitzer's investigation turned up blunt double-dealing by analysts has the SEC intensified its efforts, currently looking at other firms too, like Salomon, where telecom analyst Jack Grubman earned more than $10 million a year reeling in underwriting clients. That princely pay had nothing to do with his stock advice. Grubman rated the disastrous stock WorldCom a strong buy until mid-March, although it was down 88% from its June 1999 peak. Salomon — which has told Spitzer it did not save e-mails between analysts and bankers, as required by the SEC — says Grubman acted out of conviction, not self-interest.

Spitzer's sudden celebrity and his refusal to let go even now that the SEC has begun its investigation are an embarrassment for Pitt. Just nine months on the job, Pitt has had to reverse himself more often than a new driver learning to parallel park. A former lawyer for big accounting firms and brokerages, he started out on the permissive side of debates over whether accounting and auditing functions should coexist, whether the accounting industry needs its own watchdog group and whether measures are needed to rein in stock-option abuse. In each case, he relented only after a public outcry. Now he says tougher action is needed to protect investors from bum analyst recommendations — action that goes beyond the rules the SEC approved just last week, rules that Pitt at one time regarded as sufficient.

The latest black eye for Pitt came with the revelation that on April 26 he met secretly with Eugene O'Kelly, the new chairman of accounting firm KPMG, which is under SEC investigation for its audits of Xerox. The accounting firm was Pitt's legal client for years, and the meeting prompted the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times to run editorials saying Pitt may have to go. In an interview on CNBC last Friday, Pitt called his critics "misguided" and said, "I will serve as long as the President has confidence in me."

Pitt came to the job with a goal of regulating through consensus and self-policing, a stark change from his predecessor, Arthur Levitt, who was an outspoken ally of the small investor. In the wake of Enron, Pitt hasn't had a chance to test his style, and the hard-charging Spitzer is now making many wonder if Pitt isn't plain soft. "The SEC under Harvey Pitt has been something of a reluctant regulator," says John Coffee, professor of securities law at Columbia University. Damon Silvers, associate general counsel at the AFL-CIO, which has been carping about analyst abuses for a year, says, "The SEC was a little late to this party." In the end, Pitt's survival doesn't mean much to investors. What they need is evidence that the game isn't rigged.