Iran and Iraq

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Privately, most leaders in the Middle East would love to see the back of Saddam Hussein. But publicly, they know that a U.S. attack on Iraq could unleash violent protests that might undermine their own grips on power. So many regional rulers find themselves in the awkward position of acquiescing to "regime change" in private while opposing it in public.

Few countries feel this dilemma more acutely than Iran. For many countries in the region an attack on Saddam is a lose-lose scenario, but Iran's stakes are more mixed. Tehran has an economic interest in maintaining the status quo, since the sanctions against Iraqi oil bring investment Iran's way. But Baghdad hosts the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq, which routinely stages raids across the border into Iran. And Iranian reformers would regard a more democratic regime in Iraq as a boost to their own hopes for political change — though the country's hard-line conservative clerics would oppose it for exactly the same reason. In the event of an attack, could Iran be persuaded to quietly share intelligence or turn a blind eye to the use of its airspace, as it did during the first Gulf War? "If it makes Iran a player, the answer would likely be yes," says one Tehran political analyst.

In public, at least, Iranian officials oppose a possible U.S. campaign. "We don't agree on striking Iraq, let alone providing services to those who seek such a strike," Iran's Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Mohammed Ali Abtahi said earlier this month. Tehran is also hesitant to condone U.S. military action, since President Bush includes Iran in the "axis of evil." Why help prosecute the "war on terrorism" when you might be the next target? But in Washington, a Pentagon official says the question for the U.S. is not whether Iran would help a U.S. campaign against Iraq, but what Tehran would do once the shooting stopped. "If we bring down Saddam, Iran might attack Iraq all over again," this official says. "They could create an empire that is worse than the one we've got."

Tehran did allow representatives of the Shi'a Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (sciri), the Iraqi opposition group it hosts, to meet with U.S. officials in Washington last week, talks that would not have taken place without the agreement of Iran's security establishment. Iraq has responded to the potential threat by seeking improved ties with Iran. According to a report published on a website linked to the Islamic Iran Participation Front, Iran's leading reformist party, Saddam's son Qusai Hussein recently met with a deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The Foreign Ministry denied a meeting took place, but the report states that Qusai offered to swap members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq wanted by Iran for some of that country's Shahob-3 missiles, which could hit Israel, and a guarantee of Iranian humanitarian aid in the event of an American attack. Tehran declined the swap, but agreed to aid that might stem the expected flow of Iraqi refugees.

In the Middle East, it is often said that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." But few observers are brave enough to say that adage would apply to the United States and Iran in the event of an American attack on Iraq.