Look Who's Got The Bomb

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The White House sees a possible opening for a form of coercive diplomacy, with which Washington would convince North Koreans that, as a top White House aide puts it, "they will pay too heavy a price if they pursue this nuclear approach." The 1994 framework is effectively dead. Pyongyang can no longer sell off its threats piecemeal. New U.S. demands will sweep across the spectrum of security issues, including a pullback of conventional forces from the DMZ. If Kim doesn't buckle, Washington will make its weight felt by cutting off outside aid except for humanitarian assistance. The risk, warns Gary Samore, a Clinton Administration National Security Council director on nonproliferation, is that Bush's tough-love diplomacy may bring on a deep chill as "existing limits on nuclear activity evaporate."

Bush hopes the threat of a nuclear North Korea will galvanize South Korea, Japan, China and Russia to join the U.S. in a united front that can pressure Pyongyang to disarm. They have never agreed, however, on the best way to end North Korea's isolation. "The diplomacy of this is tricky," says the Bush aide. Yet the implications of confrontation show negotiations have got to be tried.