Tackling Terror

Sin

ce the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, a fragmented al-Qaeda has been relying on its associate groups in Asia, the Middle East and the Caucuses to continue its fight. Of all these groups, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian and Australian arm, has been by far the most active. The countries that took it least seriously until the Bali bombings—Indonesia, Australia and Thailand—are precisely where JI has had most freedom of movement. It's not hard to deduce why Bali struck JI as an ideal target. After all, JI was more constrained in mounting an operation in Singapore and Malaysia, thanks to the arrest of operatives there, the seizure of assets and heightened security. In Australia, JI cells were almost all support and not combat units. In Thailand, important JI functionaries were present. In Indonesia the JI infrastructure was fully operational. As the security of U.S. and other diplomatic missions was tightened in Jakarta, JI was forced to set its sights on a soft target.

In mid-January of this year, JI operational commander Riduan Isamuddin, known as Hambali, met with Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a 21-year-old Cana-dian operative of al-Qaeda in southern Thailand. Hambali, who trained and fought in Afghanistan from 1987 to 1991, is a member of both the JI and al-Qaeda consultative councils. Ham-bali proposed to Jabarah—who was dispatched to the region by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, head of al-Qaeda's military committee—that the terror campaign evolve to bombing bars, nightclubs and restaurants frequented by Westerners.

After the U.S. interrogation of Jabarah (arrested in Oman and handed over to the Americans), the FBI issued a memo on August 22 to the regional intelligence community about JI's intentions. Al-Qaeda, and especially JI, had identified Australia as an enemy. But despite the Australian embassy in Singapore being identified as an al-Qaeda target, Osama bin Laden's statement that Australia has waged a "crusade" against the Islamic world and dismembered East Timor, credible intelligence that a number of Afghanistan-trained Australians were dispatched on missions to strike inside Australia, and Australia's high profile participation in the campaign in Afghanistan, Canberra announced a week before Bali that there was no significant threat of terrorism to Australia or to its interests overseas.

		LATEST COVER STORY The Lure of the Rings December 2, 2002 Issue Past Issues Bali Terror Suspects Nov. 25, 2002 ----------------- Yao Ming Nov. 18, 2002 ----------------- China Culture Nov. 11, 2002 ----------------- North Korea Nov. 4, 2002 ----------------- After Bali Oct. 28, 2002 ----------------- Tadanobu Asano Oct. 21, 2002 ----------------- China's Most Wanted Oct. 14, 2002 ----------------- Headache Prevention Oct. 7, 2002 ----------------- Asia's AIDS Crisis Sep. 30, 2002 ----------------- China's New Rich Sep. 23, 2002 ----------------- Ready for War? Sep. 16, 2002 ----------------- 9/11 Remembered Sep. 9, 2002 ----------------- Green Century Sep. 2, 2002 ----------------- Asian Journey Aug. 19-26, 2002 -----------------   ASIA'S WAR ON TERRORISM  Where Will They Strike Next?  Will They Strike Again?  Viewpoint: Tackling Terror ASIA  PAKISTAN: General Strike  Letter from India: The Silent Scream GLOBAL BUSINESS  India: Speed Dialing  Li Ka-shing: 3G Glasses  China: Hard Cell ARTS  Books: The Crazed  Books: Memoirs of a Geisha NOTEBOOK  North Korea: Nuclear Agenda  Hong Kong: Sex, Lies and Probates  Singapore: Bubble Burst  Milestones TRAVEL  Bali: Desperately Seeking Survival CNN.com: Top Headlines

The lesson of Bali is now clear. Countries that tolerate terrorists or are reluctant to act against terrorists will suffer. Though JI cells were detected and neutralized in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, Indonesia's President Megawati Sukarnoputri placed her political career before national and regional security. Even after Bali, Jakarta is only going after JI members directly connected to the Kuta bomb blast, not JI as an organization and not its political wing—the Mujahidin Council led by Abubakar Ba'asyir—or its militia—Laskar Jundullah led by Agus Dwikarna. As a result, JI will be able to strike again inside Indonesia and continue to use Indonesia as a launching pad for attacks on its neighbors.

But through trial and error, Asian governments are now rapidly developing a reasonably good understanding of the terrorist network: its functionaries, assets, linkages and modus operandi. JI is a multinational organization of some 400 trained members operating across territorial borders. Therefore, it's paramount for regional governments to develop a regional task force to fight JI. Whenever JI has been targeted in one place, its operatives and assets have moved to a neighboring country. The nature of the JI organization is such that no one single country can successfully fight and dismantle it. The key to fighting JI lies in common counterterrorism intelligence databases, exchange of personnel, transfer of expertise, joint operations, and most important, sharing of experience.

The fight against terrorism must also tackle its roots. JI draws support from Muslims disenchanted with their lot. The authorities need to ensure that Muslim communities in their countries are not marginalized or demonized. And they need to telegraph that JI is not Islamic but heretical. Like al-Qaeda, JI misinterprets and misrepresents the Koran to advance its own objectives.

JI's capabilities cannot be degraded and destroyed by military means alone. Fighting it is a multiagency effort involving the customs, immigration, coast guard, police, military, intelligence services, community organizations, religious institutions, schools and the mass media. The terrorist threat is now dispersed, and so even more dangerous. But with determination, commitment and unity of purpose at all levels, especially political, this is a war that can be won.