Showdown With The Rebel

Al-Sadr also sees profit in lashing out at Allawi's fragile government. He has kept up his barrage of sermons criticizing the new leadership's failure to improve civil services and security. But some who know al-Sadr say his decision to resume combat had little to do with citizens' grievances and a lot to do with the improving ability of Iraqi government forces to challenge his control in Najaf. Since the hand-off, the strength of the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi police officers has grown; they are stopping thieves, arresting drug dealers, slowly winning the loyalty of Najaf's embattled citizens.

The Mahdi militia regarded the new forces as a rival gang on its turf. Two weeks ago, government security men arrested one of al-Sadr's closest aides in nearby Karbala, and the truce unraveled from there. Al-Sadr's militiamen then accused U.S. Marines, who have recently taken over responsibility for policing Najaf, of breaking the cease-fire's rules by moving into parts of the city that were supposed to be off limits to them. U.S. officials put the blame on the militia: in the early hours of Aug. 5, Mahdi fighters assaulted a police station with such ferocity that the Iraqis inside had to call for U.S. help. The war was on.

Making matters worse was the absence of Sistani, who left his home in Najaf two weeks ago for medical treatment in London. Al-Sadr supporters say the U.S. was exploiting his absence to crack down on the populist cleric. But Sistani's associates say al-Sadr was the one taking advantage of the ayatullah's departure to intensify his campaign against the U.S. Just before undergoing angioplasty, the Grand Ayatullah issued a strong statement calling on all parties to stop the fighting.

That may have encouraged the sides to step back for a moment from a climactic confrontation. But al-Sadr has a proven track record of standing up to the U.S. by exploiting American reluctance to storm a holy place. "The shrine," says British Major General Andrew Graham, deputy commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, "is an invisible shield. He's picked a battlefield where he knows we won't go." That is why both sides have repeated the pattern of go-no-go set in Fallujah. "Tell me," says Graham, "what are the alternatives?"