Can This War Be Won?

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U.S. leaders say once the offensives begin, they will be modeled on the August battle to remove al-Sadr's Mahdi Army from the holy shrine of Najaf — in which U.S. forces pounded militia positions until al-Sadr agreed to turn over the shrine to Iraqi forces. The military has since moved to reassert itself in no-go areas like Baghdad's Sadr City slum and Samarra, a rebel-friendly city north of Baghdad. But U.S. forces encountered resistance trying to patrol both places last week. The fight to take back rebel sanctuaries could well result in heavy casualties on both sides, but at this point the U.S. doesn't have much choice. "The Iraqis are already paying a hell of a price in terms of the violence being inflicted on their own people," says Zinni. "It's pay me now or pay me later."

2. Train Iraqis
American commanders say they have the military firepower to uproot the rebels from their havens. But even Iraqis who loathe the insurgency won't tolerate a constant U.S. military presence in their neighborhoods. The only viable solution is to nudge Iraqi forces forward to take over the job of maintaining order. The Pentagon aims to train enough Iraqi forces to control the whole country by year's end, but there's little chance it will meet that goal. Of the 260,000 Iraqis recruited for the new security forces, about 95,000 have been trained. Last week Kerry called for a stepped-up effort to deploy an Iraqi army but offered few specifics beyond what the military is already doing. The U.S. has added $1.8 billion to the $3.4 billion it originally earmarked for the task of building an indigenous force. U.S. commanders say they have seen improvement in the capabilities of Iraqi units since their miserable performance during the fighting last spring, demonstrated most dramatically in the battle for Najaf. "It was a flip-flop," says Air Force General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The estimate is that 70% of the Iraqi units that participated performed very, very well."

For U.S. forces to turn over responsibility, that percentage will have to rise. The Iraqis have been bolstered by the recent arrival of sorely needed supplies of body armor, ammunition and weapons that had been held up for months by Pentagon red tape. But cultivating commanders who can impose discipline on their forces — especially in the face of insurgent threats — will be a much slower process. "The tough stuff is the soft stuff," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told lawmakers last week. "It's the chain of command, the leadership structure — reality tells me that's going to be the toughest part of the puzzle."

3. Improve Intelligence
Since the start of the occupation, the biggest obstacle to defeating the insurgency has been the U.S.'s struggle to identify the enemy. Estimates of the size and composition of the insurgency fluctuate daily. Military officials and insurgent sources say the resistance is being spearheaded by jihadists loyal to al-Zarqawi. U.S. intelligence sources believe, according to an official, that while foreign fighters make up a small fraction of the insurgency, they may account for as much as 50% or more of suicide bombings, the deadliest weapon in the enemy's arsenal.