National Defense: THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE CARIBBEAN SEA

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Constant vigilance by Army and Navy is the only weapon against sabotage or the surprise raid. And if any enemy were not marvelously successful in his first attempt he might well fail for good. But operating from bases in the Caribbean he could go about his business much more methodically. The only effective defense is to keep him at a distance. Hence the second paradox of defense. The best way to defend the Canal is to defend seas 1,000 to 2,000 miles beyond the Canal.

Hook. From Florida's tip to the top of South America the islands of the Caribbean swing in a great hook, its shank extending southeast, its barb curving south and west.

The islands of the hook form a natural line of fine defensive outposts with great stretches of blue water between them and the closest jumping-off places for a European invader: the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. Thus they are potential operating bases from which the U. S. Fleet and land-based aircraft can range far to sea, spotting and striking at any invader as close to his European base as possible. But while the islands make one of the world's finest strategic assets, they are also great potential liabilities. An enemy with a toe hold on the Caribbean not only might close the Canal and shut off the Fleet in the Pacific; by destroying the Canal he might also cut off naval elements in the Atlantic from the Navy's great base on the Pacific side of the Canal at Balboa. And while the Pacific Fleet was exhausting fuel and losing time going around the Horn—a 48-day run—he could make sea and air raids on the continental U. S., might possibly even grab Bermuda, only 700 miles from New York and Philadelphia.

The big advantage of the U. S. in defense of the Caribbean is its short and well-protected supply lines. No invader could come close to duplicating them until he had based himself in the area, close to the rich oil supplies of northern Venezuela and the food supplies of South America.

And with Army bombers and the U. S. Navy vigorously interdicting his supply lines from Europe, setting up such a base would be no cinch. To do so would take a huge fleet which probably would have to get a foothold in South America (preferably on Brazil's jutting coast 1,000 miles from the Cape Verde Islands) before extending himself to the north.

U. S. communications to the Caribbean lie south along the U. S. coast from the Atlantic seaboard, across the Gulf of Mexico (a near-impregnable American lake) from the oil centres at New Orleans, Houston, Galveston, and down Mexico's coast via the Canal from the Pacific. U. S. bases along these routes are indicated by U. S. flags, foreign bases by anchors. Air bases in the area are indicated by airplanes —red for land craft, blue for seaplanes.