National Defense: THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE CARIBBEAN SEA

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Leewards to Venezuela. From this eastern outpost the hook swings on south, to the British-owned island of Trinidad off Venezuela's northern coast. Trinidad is an operating base to make an invader's eyes gleam—a bountiful oil and gasoline supply, strategically laid in flank of traffic from South America where he might have a foothold. It would also make an important U. S. outpost, completing the defense set-up of the hook. Its anchorages are deep and wide and its northwest coves would make good seaplane bases. Since it lies well within the U. S. sphere, the British have never developed it as a top-flight operating base. Its dry dock will accommodate nothing larger than destroyers, and it has no landplane base. Near by at Barbados the British have a battleship anchorage, a small airdrome and a tiny dry dock (too small for destroyers). At France's Martinique there is a small naval and submarine base, a destroyer dry dock. But of first-class base facilities the Lesser Antilles have none. And it is in this section of the hook that an invader reaching for the Canal would almost inevitably make his strongest effort. Between its islands are scores of deep passages, in its coves thousands of spots from which destroyers, cruisers and patrol bombers could operate as soon as field repair facilities and oil-fuel supplies had been laid down. At the western foot of the Lesser Antilles, at Aruba in The Netherlands West Indies, is the world's largest oil refinery. At The Netherlands' Curacao near by are good commercial docks and workshops, an ample supply of fuel. Here, in the most valuable and most vulnerable area of the Caribbean, is the first outpost of the U. S.'s maritime frontier.