ARMY: Baffle of Louisiana

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Dargue's airmen bombed the daylights out of Ben Lear's rear-area supplies (including gasoline for the tanks) as far back as Shreveport. Support aviation, including dive-bombers from the Navy (under Army command), blasted at tanks, then blew up the bridges across the Red River. Meanwhile the Red tanks had been stopped, and the gaps they had made plugged up by sweating infantrymen.

Final blow came as General Krueger threw his cavalry in. Innis P. Swift, commander of the Blue's First Cavalry Division, swept out of East Texas with 17,500 men, on horse, motorcycle and scout car, slashed east and north around the Reds' right flank in a night ride. By that time Ben Lear knew the worst. Driven back from two headquarters, he had lost most of his rear-area supplies to Horseman Swift.

As the push developed, Dargue's airmen bombed the Reds with leaflets: "Your commanders are withholding from you the terrible fact of your impending defeat. Your gasoline stores have been captured. From now on, if you move, you do it on the soles of your shoes."

Apart from the battle's result, Army men as well as lay observers were mightily pleased with what they saw: two well-trained, hardened armies whose soldiers knew their jobs and were keen to do them well.

Because road discipline and staff work were good, troop movements were carried out swiftly. Supply, in a fluid battle where everything depended on the swift movement of fighting units, went on without a major hitch.

From umpires (unofficially) came kudos for the crack work of the Blue air forces. The Reds were less happy over the work of their air force and their communications. Biggest small surprise was the work of the Blues' 127 parachutists dropped in Red country. By agreement all were to surrender, if not captured, 20 hours after landing. When the 20 hours expired, more than half of them were still on the loose, slashing wire lines and generally playing havoc with Red communications.

Although the over-all results of the maneuvers' first battle were good enough, the showing of enlisted soldiers (particularly noncoms) better than that, the week's hard pounding showed up many a soft spot. One of them was communications, which did not always function at par. Another was the poor tactical showing of many officers.

In spite of a flat warning that their showing in battle would determine whether they would be sent home or kept in uniform, many a ranker, many a subaltern flubbed his battle shots. Through the maneuver area ran the rumor that when next week's battle was over the cleanout of substandard officers would be terrific—perhaps as high as 30%.

Said Lieut. General Lesley J. McNair, GHQ Chief of Staff, with characteristic frankness: "A lot of these Generals who want to fire their Chiefs of Staff ought to fire themselves. We're going to start at the top and work down. We've got some bum Generals, and maybe I'm one of them, but we're going to weed them out. Have we the bright young Majors and Captains to replace them? Yes."