BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC: One Year of War

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Appraising the gains from the Navy's first offensive, Admiral King and other Navy men noticeably do not accent the relative U.S. and Japanese sea losses. One reason probably is that naval officers do for themselves what the Navy seldom does for the public: they add up the total losses in the campaign, and weigh them against the Navy's remaining strength, instead of dwelling upon the results of individual actions.

Admiral King presumably does not forget that in the Coral Sea-Solomons series of actions the Navy has announced loss of three aircraft carriers (not counting one lost at Midway), seven cruisers, 13 destroyers. In the same actions the Navy has claimed the definite sinking of one Japanese carrier, 12 cruisers, one battleship (and possibly another) and 17 destroyers. In the terms of remaining U.S. and Japanese strength—the only terms that count—this balance is favorable to the U.S. in every category except carriers, but the net effect on Pacific sea power is decidedly less than the bare figures from recent actions indicated.

King on Command: "I have a philosophy that when you have a commander in the field, let him know what you want done and then let him alone. I have two other philosophies. One is: Do the best you can with what you have. The other is: Don't worry about water over the dam."

According to Admiral King, the Coral Sea, Midway and the Solomons prove that the U.S. had what many people thought it still needed: true unity of command. He also said that:

> The broad directives for Pacific campaigns come not only from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S. Army & Navy), but from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (U.S. and Great Britain).

> General MacArthur had "a clear directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff," giving him sole authority over all ground, air and naval forces (including the Australian Navy and some remnants of the Dutch Fleet) in the southwest Pacific. It was on orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that MacArthur's bombers timed their attacks on the Japs in Rabaul and the upper Solomons with the Navy's offensive ("a very important mission, and one which was planned and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff"). For the campaign in the Solomons, General MacArthur was also ordered to turn his Australian naval forces over to the U.S. Navy.

>"Prior to that action, the Solomons had all been in MacArthur's command, but to make sure that there was no misunderstanding, the line of demarcation was straightened." (The effect of the straightening was to put the area to be invaded solely under Navy command. MacArthur kept the upper Solomons and Rabaul, where the Navy and Army presumably will have to arrange an understanding.)

>Area commanders often have complete freedom of decision. Example: Admiral Nimitz' decision to concentrate his forces for the Battle of Midway, when the Japs might have struck in force elsewhere. ("We knew what Nimitz was doing. He did the right thing, and we let him alone.")

King on Allies. Whether or not Admiral King left any doubt as to the actual unity of U.S. command, he left no doubt at all about the state of the United Nations command or his ideas on the subject. Said he: