Honor & Responsibility

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For the U.S. people the appointment of rugged, incisive Lieut. General Dwight David Eisenhower as top commander in North Africa came as a dramatic fillip. Here was proof enough of the dominant potential of the U.S. in World War II: "Ike" Eisenhower might one day lead the invasion into the Festung Europa.

It was gratifying, too, that General Eisenhower would probably be flanked in North Africa by three crack Britons —General Sir Harold Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. (The shift in command also sent air-minded Lieut. General Frank M. Andrews to head all U.S. troops in the European theater —with his base in England, now one long runway for bomber attacks on Germany.)

But these probabilities provided concrete evidence only of this: that at least two of the United Nations could agree on a unified command, and if U.S. prestige had been advanced, U.S. responsibilities had been immensely increased.

Military Future. Meanwhile, the nation could only wonder — what next? There were no further clues to the possible invasion points which had been "pretty well settled" at Casablanca. Amateur strategists, taking a hint from Winston Churchill's visit to Turkey (TIME, Feb. 8), speculated over an invasion of the Balkans—a drive similar to the Allied campaign which helped crack the German juggernaut in 1918. These were speculations which the nation was willing to leave to the masters of high strategy.

Political Future. But the political issues were the nation's worry. It was now three months since the U.S. people had had the satisfaction of any decisive military action on the part of U.S. troops across the Atlantic. The U.S., instead of fighting, seemed caught in the worst meshes of international politics. The U.S. people had hoped that Casablanca would resolve some discords; in the subsequent letdown they could feel no emotion more constructive than restlessness.

What tack would the U.S. take in the months to come? If the occupation of French North Africa had posed a thorny politico-moral issue, still unsolved, it was nothing compared to the complications which would arise with, say, a Balkan invasion—on which Russia would most assuredly have to be consulted. Until now, Russia has not shown her hand—a fact compounded of Soviet secrecy and a negative Anglo-American policy. Whether or not such a Balkan adventure was ever contemplated, there was urgent reason right now for an Anglo-American political understanding with Russia, and the means for such an understanding seemed to lie in a U.S.-Soviet conference. (At his press conference Franklin Roosevelt was asked if he hoped to meet Joseph Stalin. Said the President: hope springs eternal.)

But the most burning political sore spot of the moment is that the United Nations, 13 months after their formation, are not yet united. Here was the cause of the nation's apprehension, and here the need for action.