Where Goss Sees Trouble

FAILING TO CONNECT THE DOTS Before al-Qaeda's attacks, the agency was still risk averse, a result of investigations into power abuses in the '70s. Key intelligence — including proof that al-Qaeda suspects were entering the U.S.--wasn't shared with other agencies until it was too late, and field officers were more likely to be stationed in embassies than inside enemy territory. Congress is debating reforms, and Goss wants to encourage more risk taking

CONNECTING TOO MANY DOTS Former Director George Tenet reportedly told President Bush the agency had a "slam dunk" case that Iraq was developing WMD. But as analysts prepared the National Intelligence Estimate of Iraq's capabilities, important caveats were cut. The agency had almost no operatives in Iraq after 1998, so it had to rely on information from foreign intelligence services, defectors and exile groups. Much of it was ambiguous and, in some cases, just plain wrong

UNAUTHORIZED LEAKS Two months before the election, unnamed CIA, Pentagon and State Department professionals began grumbling to reporters that Iraq was in much worse shape than Bush was claiming on the stump. After the leak of a July National Intelligence Estimate predicting Iraq could be in civil war by the end of 2005, conservative columnist Robert Novak accused the CIA of trying to undermine the President's re-election

FREELANCING The former top analyst in the CIA's bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, published an anonymous book last summer — cleared by the agency — accusing the Administration of botching the war on terrorism. A 22-year CIA veteran, Scheuer repeated his charges in frequent media appearances, even after superiors ordered him to stop. Critics say he should never have been given approval to write the book in the first place. Scheuer resigned from the agency two weeks ago