World War: EASTERN THEATER: Decision in a Week?

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Weaknesses. But geography was not what the Germans were after. They were after the Russian Army. Their only objective was to divide the Army, subdivide it, chop it, grind it into broken little gobbets, so that all the Kremlin's horses and all of its men would be unable to make it cohere again.

The first week saw that grinding process far along. Why were the Russians unable to prevent it? They had studied German tactics. They were brave. They were ready. Why were they incapable of keeping themselves intact?

Many factors weighed against them:

¶Their Air Force was untested in combat; it was probably outnumbered, since the Germans stripped other fronts to the aerial minimum. Russian airfields had apparently been placed too near the border.

¶Russian communications were miserable. Russian railways, which have to carry four-fifths as much traffic as American roads, have only one-fourth the trackage. Russian roads are so poor that railroads had to carry 84% of all traffic in 1937. These handicaps accentuated the traditional torpidity of Russian armed masses.

¶There was a fundamental confusion in the Russian system of defenses. Heaviest fixed defenses were behind the old Russian border—a system of defense-in-depth not as formidable as the Maginot Line. And yet large, heavy forces were concentrated in the buffer areas acquired by Russia since 1939. These front forces tried to stand, then tried to retire after the Germans had broken through, instead of fighting a quick rearguard action back to the areas where there was relatively concentrated defense.

¶Russian equipment was in most respects as good as German; but whereas some German units had one machine in ready reserve for every one in action and had expert technicians to service the machines of war, the Russians had slim reserves and inadequate provision for maintenance.

After several days of clanking, jolting action, this difference told.

The Pathetic Fallacy which gave the Russians—and most of the world—continuing hope was the Napoleonic parallel.

After so many people had clung to the World War I parallel on the French Front, until the Maginot Line was flanked and it was clear that this would be no war of position, it was strange that so many more clung to the even more antique Napoleonic parallel—the belief that by drawing the Germans forward into huge Russia, the defenders could let weather and distance defeat Adolf Hitler just as it had Napoleon Bonaparte.

Adolf Hitler's Army is as light on its feet as a ballerina. Its supply system (airplane, truck, motorcycle sidecar) and its communications (uncoded wireless, telephoning as simply as calling up the girl friend) move like clockwork. While trying to withdraw before this system, any Army, and especially the sluggish, massive Red Army, would be bound to lose more than it hurt and would probably be demolished before it retreated enough hundreds of miles to tire out the attacker.

Besides, Adolf Hitler has heard of Napoleon. He certainly does not intend to go one tank-chug farther than he can take care of himself. His High Command have very obviously limited their sphere of operations; they intend to accomplish their mission of destruction before going the geographical limit.