U.S. At War: $134,000,000 Memo

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James H. Graham, onetime engineering professor at the University of Kentucky, had no idea that his one-page memo would launch a $134,000,000 rumpus. An old friend and $1-a-year assistant to the U.S. Army Service Force's Lieut. General Brehon B. Somervell, Mr. Graham had been asked to figure out a quick, sure way to supply the Alaska Highway with oil and high-octane gas. Engineer Graham studied maps and mulled over the problem at intervals for two months in the spring of 1942. Then he suggested: Why not develop the Canadian oil resources at Nor man Wells? The very next day, General Somervell's signature converted this scant ily researched suggestion into an official Army order (TIME, Dec. 6).

Before Mr. Graham could say "Canol," the U.S. was committed to a project requiring 200,000 tons of shipping space, hundreds of vital priorities, shiploads of precious refinery equipment, 4,000 troops, 12,000 civilians. Prospectors probed for oil 75 miles south of the Arctic circle; roads sprang up through Canada's frozen wilder ness; shivering crews stretched 4-in. pipe line from Norman Wells on the Mackenzie River across 500 miles of barren north west territory to Whitehorse on the Yukon.

This week the Truman Committee reported to U.S. taxpayers that the man-hours, materials and money already spent on Canol have been an "inexcusable" waste. The committee admitted that the Army might be partially forgiven a mis take during the frenzied months after Pearl Harbor. But what the Committee could not condone, nor ask the U.S. to dismiss lightly, was the stubborn brass-hattery which had refused, time & time again, to correct, or even to admit the original blunder. The Army had been amply warned:

> Major General T. M. Robins, Army engineer, read the first Somervell order. Said he: a few barges from U.S. inland waters could easily transport ten times the oil to Canada with one-tenth the cost and effort. When no one paid any attention to his comments, General Robins followed orders and went to work.

¶Imperial Oil (a subsidiary of Standard of New Jersey), which owned the Canadian oil lands leased only for the duration by the U.S., saw "very great difficulties" in the "feasibility and . . . expedition" of the plan. The plan proceeded, anyway.

¶Standard Oil of California, called in as technical adviser to the Army, threw cold water. Would not a mere 3,000 bbl. of oil a day by the spring of 1944 be "too little and too late?" Would not a costly refinery only 150 miles from the Pacific coast be a too-easy target to enemy aircraft? The hints were ignored.

¶Petroleum Boss Harold Ickes (who is supposed to coordinate all Government oil activities) heard about Canol through Washington gossip. He found Canol "well-nigh fantastic." He told General Somervell that one U.S. tanker, making four trips, could supply the Alaska Highway with as much aviation gas as the Army's whole costly drilling-piping-refining project. General Somervell was not impressed.

When the General Staff became curious, General Somervell gave Canol a hazy but reassuring recommendation.

The Budget Bureau, brooding aloud over the $134,000,000, received a peremptory Army rebuff: "The Canol project must be completed as rapidly as possible and without further interference or delay."