BOLIVIA: Counterattack

The Bolivian Affair is close to a showdown. The climax will feature high diplomacy, cold economics and a strong dash of cops-&-robbers. If it turns out well, the U.S. and 18 of the 20 "Good Neighbors" will have won a resounding victory. If it does not, the whole Good Neighbor policy in Latin America will have suffered a grave defeat.

The Challenge. Said Secretary of State Cordell Hull: "It is my information that by the consultation now in progress [among 18 American Republics] there is already taking place considerable exchange of information regarding the origin of the revolution in Bolivia. This assembling of facts should soon permit each government to reach its own conclusions. The information available here increasingly strengthens the belief that forces outside Bolivia and unfriendly to the defense of the American Republics inspired and aided the Bolivian revolution."

To diplomats, this turgid language was as clear as a Hull curse. It meant that: 1) the U.S. would not recognize the revolutionary regime of Bolivia's new President, Major Gualberto Villarroel; 2) the U.S. blamed Argentina and Nazi Germany for putting the Villarroel junta in power; 3) a hemispheric united front was being formed to smash it. An even stronger blast against both Bolivia and Argentina was scheduled for this week.

Counterrevolution? One way to deal with an unsatisfactory revolution is to arrange a counterrevolution. This week nobody could prove that the State Department was trying to do so. But it was certainly watching Bolivian moves & countermoves:

¶José Antonio Arze, leader of the leftist PIR (Partido de Izquierda Revolucion-ario) had arrived in Lima, Peru, from Mexico. The Bolivian Government pointedly advised him to stay out of Bolivia. This week he turned up in Bolivia.

¶The PIR, a workers' party without visible military support of its own, might find such support in General David Toro, ex-President of Bolivia (1936-37), who when last seen was dodging reporters in New York and Washington.

¶In close touch with anti-Villarroel elements are Dr. Luis Fernando Guachalla, the deposed Bolivian Government's Ambassador to the U.S., and Manuel Carrasco, former President of the Bolivian Senate.

¶One way to deal with a counterrevolution is to take its principal leaders into the existing Government. The Villarroel regime may invite Arze to join. Whether he would accept is not certain.

Out of these maneuverings might come a counterrevolutionary slate with Arze for President, General Toro for Minister of Defense. The Cabinet presumably would include "good" members from all major parties—perhaps eventually even the non-Fascists in the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) now in power.

Any counterrevolution would involve grave diplomatic risks. Latin America might applaud for a while, but each country would always fear some similar move against itself. Perhaps the U.S. looked to other, less Machiavellian measures.