Army & Navy - COMMAND: The Generals Smith

At a Washington press conference, after his return last week from the Marianas, tough Lieut. General Holland M. Smith, commander of all the Marines in the Pacific,* was asked an embarrassing question. Was it true that he had fired one of his division commanders, the Army's Major General Ralph Smith, during the battle of Saipan?

Snorted "Howlin' Mad" Smith: "I knew someone would ask that question. One of the many prerogatives and responsibilities of a commanding officer ... is the assignment and transfer of officers commanding subordinate elements. . . . Unfortunately, circumstances forced me to exercise one of these prerogatives. I did relieve General Ralph Smith."

For further details Howlin' Mad Smith referred reporters to the War Department (because Ralph Smith is an Army general). The War Department referred them back to Holland Smith (because he had made the change in command). But a long hushed-up fact had been officially admitted. The story—still unofficial:

Army Version. Ralph C. Smith, 50, handsome and soft-voiced, commanded the 27th (New York National Guard) Army Division, until Howlin' Mad relieved him on the ninth day of the 25-day battle of Saipan. Ralph Smith was relieved, according to the Army version, because of a difference over tactics:.. Marines tear into battle, trying to win it quickly; soldiers proceed cautiously, to save lives.

When he was relieved, Ralph Smith flew 4,000 miles back to Pearl Harbor. There the Army's Lieut. General Robert C. Richardson Jr. promptly gave him command of another division—an obvious note of confidence in Ralph Smith and in the Army v. the Marines.

Marine Version. The Marines believe that their forge-ahead tactics cost less in lives than trying to cut off the enemy's tail by inches. (High Marine casualties are due to the fact that Marines are beachhead assault troops, always given the toughest assignments.) But the relief of Ralph Smith, according to the Marine version, had nothing to do with tactics.

By the eighth day of the Saipan battle the Second and Fourth Marine Divisions had advanced rapidly on each side of the island. Then they had to wait, because two regiments of the 27th Army Division—with battalions faced in three directions, unable even to form a line—were hopelessly bogged down in the center. The third regiment of the 27th meanwhile had failed dismally to clean out a pocket of Japs in the southeast corner of the island.

Although terrific artillery barrages were laid down in front of them, Ralph Smith's men froze in their foxholes. For days these men, who lacked confidence in their officers, were held up by handfuls of Japs in caves. When it began to look as if what had been gained might be lost, Fourth Marine Division troops even moved in front of a sector of the 27th's line to save it. From the Marine point of view, General Ralph Smith's chief fault was that he had long ago failed to get tough enough to remove incompetent subordinate officers.