The Will of the Minority

U.N.

On the eve of the Security Council vote on Spain last week, a reporter asked Soviet Delegate Andrei Gromyko if anything he said at the next session would create a sensation. Mr. Gromyko thought a second, then answered: "No, nothing sensational." Next day, when Gromyko lifted a lone, serge-clad arm to strike down the recommendation for a General Assembly discussion of measures against Franco, his act was, in fact, depressingly unsensational.

The world had grown used to seeing Russia use her veto power at the drop of a gavel. Russia had insisted on the veto to protect herself from the majority wielded by the democracies, but U.N. simply would not work if, on every issue, it had to bow to the minority's will.

A year ago, at San Francisco, Russia had finally agreed with the other great powers that the veto should be reserved primarily for cases of punitive action against nations, that it should not apply to mere matters of procedure. "It is not to be assumed . . ,'',Russia had declared with the U.S., Britain and China, "that the permanent members [of the Security Council] would use their 'veto' power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council." Yet twice within five months Russia, finding the veto her surest safeguard against being overruled as a permanent minority, had vetoed resolutions calling for simple peaceful settlements, had threatened to use the veto in other nonpunitive cases:

¶ Last January, Canada's Lester B. Pearson failed to be nominated as Secretary-General because Russia objected and threatened to use her veto.

¶ In February, Russia vetoed a resolution expressing confidence that Britain and France would pull out of Syria and Lebanon. (All troops are out of Syria, almost all out of Lebanon.)

¶In March, Gromyko walked out when he could not convince the rest of the Security Council that a decision to hear Iranian Ambassador Ala was a proper subject for a veto.

¶ In April, Gromyko abstained from voting on the proposal to set up a subcommittee to study Franco Spain; he clearly implied that he had a veto right but did not choose to exercise it.

¶ Last week, Gromyko vetoed the resolution against Spain primarily because Russia objected to referring the matter to the General Assembly.

The next day Russia insisted on a veto over atomic energy control measures, opposing the U.S. view that there could be no workable world atomic energy control if any nation had the power to block effective enforcement. "Under any circumstances," said Mr. Gromyko, "the veto should be retained."