FOREIGN RELATIONS: Total Diplomacy

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FOREIGN RELATIONS 'Total Diplomay'

Slowly, and almost invisibly, like a river bed shifting, the nation's foreign policy was changing its course. Its direction was fundamentally the same, as was shown in a casual remark of Harry Truman's at his weekly press conference. Was he planning a mission to Moscow? No, he said, not as long as he was President (though he might like to see the place later on as a tourist, he added). This was no time to go running off to Joe Stalin.

But the diking and channeling of foreign policy, a patchwork job and subject to inclement weather, was apparent in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's talks with individual newsmen, and with groups of businessmen, in Washington.

"Situations of Strength." In such discussions, two trends could be discerned. One was Acheson's growing conviction that the U.S. was not doing enough—that all previous imperialisms were "kid stuff" compared to Russia's, that the previous responses of diplomacy were inadequate, and that "we could lose without ever firing a shot." What was needed was not deals with the Kremlin, but new "situations of strength" which alone would deter the Communists. The. U.S., Acheson held, must fight the cold war with "total diplomacy," comparable in sacrifice by the American people to total war.

At home this might mean drastic political, social and economic changes: for example, letting in goods freely from dollar-starved Western Europe, and voting some kind of relief for damaged domestic industries. Abroad it meant seeking allies with the grim realism of war—and this was the second hardening in Acheson's thinking. "We are not dealing here," said Acheson, "with the kind of situation where we can go from one country to another with a piece of litmus paper and see whether everything is true blue. The only question we should ask is whether they are determined to protect their independence against Communist aggression."

The Value of Marx. If a nation's mere itch for independence, and not its willingness to follow a democratic way of life, was to be Acheson's touchstone of American aid, then some radical changes in U.S. thinking were called for. Was the U.S. ready to follow him? By Acheson's definition, presumably Franco's Spanish dictatorship was entitled to help. And how about Communist Tito? No longer was the State Department talking about winning him over to the Western orbit. In fact, the State Department was now saying that Tito is more valuable to the U.S. —and more deserving of help—as a Communist than if he had renounced Marx. Had Tito rejected Marx as well as Moscow, argued the State Department's "total diplomats," he would not still be a threat to the stability of the Kremlin regime from the inside. Being independent but still a Marxist, he may encourage other satellites to show a little independence.

Obviously, "total diplomacy" would need more talking about before it could count on total support.