National Affairs: From a Military Stand point11

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Though the issues raised by General MacArthur were worldwide, the first burst of debate by Congressmen and the military centered on a single technical point: Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with his proposals, as he had charged—to the loudest applause of his address?

Strictly speaking, MacArthur was dead right. In fact, the four steps he urged had been lifted from a J.C.S. proposal which had been sent him in Tokyo for comment. But whereas the J.C.S. had used the term "air reconnaissance," MacArthur went on to urge the right to "destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu" and in this he did not claim that the J.C.S. supported him, whatever the headlines, editorial writers or hasty orators said in the next 24 hours. Obviously, with his carefully phrased charge, MacArthur had scored an effective blow.

In the first few hours, all the Administration could do in rebuttal was to produce the lame statement—put out by the Pen tagon—that the President, in relieving MacArthur, had acted on the "unanimous recommendations" of his civilian and military advisers, including the Joint Chiefs, a denial which did not meet what MacArthur had charged.

But the qualification in MacArthur's speech on which the J.C.S. is likely to base its explanations to Congress is the phrase "from a military standpoint." The J.C.S. like MacArthur saw no military end to the Korean war and its steady casualties unless the U.N. command took the four steps outlined by MacArthur. But the Joint Chiefs, like MacArthur, also realized that other factors were involved e.g.: Would Russia come in? Would U.N. allies support the U.S.? As there were political estimates involved, the Joint

Chiefs fell back on military tradition, let State make the decisions in the political department.

At week's end, the Pentagon issued a gruff statement that "the basic differences" between J.C.S. and MacArthur would be explained fully to Congress.