Two Schools of Thought

Gingerly the West handed the grenade back to Russia.

At half-hour intervals, charges d'affaires of the U.S., Britain and France called on Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky with replies to the Soviet offer to "neutralize" Germany. Though the notes were identical, Vishinsky gravely heard each one read aloud, as if hearing it for the first time.

It was all very polite, and diplomatically correct. The West expressed doubts that Germany can be unified until free elections include the Soviet zone. The West wondered whether Russia intends to give Germany back the seized lands east of the Oder-Neisse rivers. And the West expressed grave reservations about letting a unified and independent Germany arm itself: arming inside a European army is one thing; arming on its own would be a "backward step." As France's Robert Schuman put it the day before: "Never leave Germany to herself is my principle."

Then the West sat back to wait for West Germany's response. Well did it know the eagerness that quickens every German's heart at the prospects of uniting their divided country.*The West, and its good friend Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, are engaged in a great gamble: to give West Germany its independence, and to integrate its troops into a European army before the cries for a free and unified Germany can thwart the plan. So far, 76-year-old Chancellor Adenauer has managed to avoid the accusation that he seeks to keep Germany divided. But his popularity is precarious; the lure of the Soviet siren is strong, and he has but 17 months left in office (if a parliamentary vote of confidence could topple the government in West Germany, Adenauer might well have fallen by now). Last week Adenauer, fighting against time, announced that West Germany would sign a peace "contract" with the Western occupying powers and get its freedom in May.

What did the Russians hope to accomplish in Germany? Though the West spoke with one tongue in its reply, it was actually of two minds.

School No. I believes that Russia's offer may really be genuine. Most European Socialists belong to this school. So does Walter Lippmann. "We must not .consider the Russian note simply an instrument of propaganda," said Schuman. "It may mark a change of Russian policy towards Germany." The argument: fearing West German rearmament, Russia may be willing to surrender its hold on East Germany in return for a unified Germany outside the Western defense system.

School No.1 cautions the West not to reject Russia's offer solely on grounds which the Russians can do something about, but the West cannot. Thus, Russia might permit free elections, and at a later date hand back the land east of the Oder-Neisse to sweeten the bargain. Then what would the West do? School No. i argues, in effect, that Russia may now be making a tactical retreat.