National Affairs: THE U.S. AND BRITAIN

Allies Undermine Each Other To Foe's Benefit

RELATIONS between the U.S. and Britain are now worse than most Americans think. On dozens of specific questions, debated in the world's chancelleries and at the U.N.. the attitudes and policies of the two allies are not merely different but actively opposed. Many a British diplomat spends more time undermining a U.S. position than in building joint defenses against Communism. And many a U.S. diplomat, busily countermining the British, worries more about them than he does about the Russians. Both nations are spending political energy against each other that could be used against the common foe.

British-American disunion is deeply significant. Since the cold war began, the anti-Communist side has had the preponderant power—military, economic and moral—but superiority has never been exercised to register proportionate gains in cold-war politics. The Communists have usually had the initiative. When they lost it, they took strong defensive positions and encouraged dissension among the anti-Communist coalition.

This typical Communist strategy was demonstrated to the world last August. The Korean armistice ended a round in which the Reds had taken the initiative, lost it at Inchon, regained it by the Red Chinese invasion, and settled down to a military stalemate translated by the armistice to a political stalemate. The U.S., by warning that it would not tolerate a new or stepped-up Red aggression, cramped the Kremlin's next move. Could the anti-Communist side, taking off from Panmunjom, find a politial initiative? It did not find one. Instead, the U.S. and Britain locked horns in the U.N. over the issue of admitting India to the Korean peace conference. Today, the anti-Communist alliance is too divided to take full advantage of one of the great political victories of the cold war: the failure of the Reds to win back more than 3% of the North Korean and Chinese prisoners whom they have interviewed.

Weakness in the anti-Communist camp is broader than U.S.British conflict. Often it has been the result of division and indecision inside the U.S. Government. But as the U.S. position under Eisenhower and Dulles became clearer and more consistent, it was bound to come into conflict with "neutralist" sentiment among the allies. In the last year of Truman-Acheson, the U.S.-British divergence was growing. It has become sharper.

Specific conflicts in which it is notably grave:

Red China. Undismayed by Peking's stony refusal to give full recognition to Her Majesty's government, Britain insists on recognizing Mao Tse-tung, wants his representative to take Nationalist China's seat (with veto) on the U.N. Security Council. The British argument: all governments in power should be recognized, not matter how they gained power or how they behave. Britain hopes to encourage Mao to become a Tito. The U.S. believes that recognition will vastly increase Red China's prestige and help to fasten Communism on all of Asia.