DEFENSE: Atlas at the Gap?

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Up before the U.S. Air Force's top-level air staff for consideration this week is a new proposal for bridging the so-called "missile gap" in the early 1960s—the period when the U.S., by Defense Secretary Neil McElroy's estimate, will be outgunned 3 to 1 by the Communists in intercontinental ballistic missiles. The new proposal: double the U.S.'s planned production of ICBMs by mid-1963. Planning now calls for the deployment of 90 Atlas ICBMs and 110 Titan ICBMs in 20 squadrons of ten missiles apiece by mid-1963. The U.S., under the new proposal, would add 200 more Atlas ICBMs to the buildup. Cost over four years: about $2.5 billion, with a relatively small $500 million to come out of the fiscal 1960 budget as a first installment on buying the added striking power.

The new proposal runs head on into accepted U.S. strategic doctrine as evolved by the Pentagon and defended by Defense Secretary McElroy before recent hearings of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee (TIME, Feb. 9). The Administration's thesis: 1) the U.S. will get through the missile gap of the early 1960s with a "diversified" deterrent of manned thermonuclear bombers, Navy carriers and missile-firing nuclear submarines, plus a slowly growing, minimum force of Atlas and Titan ICBMs and the medium-range ballistic missile Thor; 2) the U.S. will close the gap around 1964 to the U.S.S.R.'s disadvantage when the Air Force deploys its "second-generation" solid-fuel Minuteman ICBM in hundreds of underground silos as the missile age's first true mass weapon.

The Weak Spots. But, say Air Force missilemen, the "diversified" deterrent of the early 19605 has weak spots, both specific and strategic. U.S. strike power is clearly supreme now, but:

1) U.S. overseas bases in Western Europe, North Africa, Turkey, etc. will shortly be within range—if not now—of the U.S.S.R.'s first-generation intermediate-range (600-1,200-mile missiles and can be knocked out without warning;

2) SAC's home bases—a total of less than 50—will become vulnerable when the U.S.S.R. builds its expected 500-1,500 ICBMs in 1962-63;

3) Even in SAC's fondest dreams, it has little hope of getting an effective warning system much before 1960-61, in any event can hardly hope for much more warning than the 15 minutes' interval between blast-off and strike. Said SAC's Commanding General Tom Power in testimony last month before the Preparedness Subcommittee: SAC has no "airborne alert" in the sense of loaded bombers in midair at all times, and without adequate warning "it is conceivable that you could knock out SAC."

Beyond that, the solid-fuel Minuteman is still in the primary stages, is by no means the sure gap-closer for 1964 that Administration estimates indicate. The point: the Administration ought not to bet so heavily in strategic doctrine upon a weapon still in its infancy. And the U.S. deterrent to war will not deter unless it is backed up by enough protected missiles to strike the retaliatory blow.