Defense: Streamlining the Guard

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Since taking command of the Pentagon last year. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has vigorously goaded the sacred cows of the armed forces, to bellows of dismay from affronted admirals, generals and Congressmen. Last week it was the state Governors' turn to yowl as McNamara took steps to put a halter on the most sacred cow of all: the Army National Guard. At their conference in Hershey, Pa., the Governors met with McNamara to protest his plan to reform and cut back the Guard, a traditional source of political power, prestige and pay in their home states.

The Governors had been fretting about McNamara since last spring, when word got out that he considered the Guard oversized, undertrained and largely outmoded in the age of nuclear deterrence and guerrilla warfare. McNamara had his reasons. When two National Guard divisions were federalized during the Berlin buildup—the 49th Armored of Texas and the 32nd Infantry of Wisconsin—McNamara was shocked to find that these supposedly crack units needed nearly five months to reach combat status. He discovered that the Guard had 95 antiaircraft companies armed with old-line 90-mm. guns that were useless against supersonic jet aircraft. And he found that the Guard was loaded down with such excess baggage as laundry companies, bath units, public relations men and special service companies to entertain the troops.

Confused Case. To get the Guard ready to fight in the nuclear age, McNamara proposed maintaining its $400 million annual budget, but cutting allotted manpower from 400,000 to 367,000, weeding out obsolete units, and adding up-to-date components. Most important of all, McNamara planned to build up six divisions to 10,800 men and four brigades to 3,300 men—80% to 85% of their authorized strength, and the highest level ever attained by major Guard forces in peacetime. Well equipped and well trained, the units would be ready to fight within two months of federalization.

McNamara's plan for the Guard was far from a revolutionary reform, but its political pitfalls proved to be many and deep. First off, he made the mistake, rare for him, of confusing his whole case with a bungled Pentagon presentation on the Hill that enraged Congressmen. Both the House and Senate now seem likely to insist that the Guard's strength be kept at 400,000 men—a figure that the Guard now falls below. But this manpower requirement would not prevent McNamara from realigning units as he saw fit, and he would be able to build toward it leisurely and with more effective units.

Second Thoughts. What stands in his way is the obdurate opposition of the Governors, who control the Guard in their states during peacetime. To woo them, McNamara was well prepared when he arrived in Hershey. After warmly shaking hands with every Governor in sight, McNamara read a speech pointing out that the reshuffling of the Guard would cause a decrease of only 295 units from the present total of 4,336. Only 16 of the 2,428 armories, he promised, would be left without a unit. And, on the sorest point of all, he noted that the proposed manpower cut of 33,000 would not be too difficult to achieve since the Guard loses 100,000 men each year by normal attrition. He was too diplomatic to add that in many states the Guard now has to recruit desperately to keep its rosters filled.