Russia: The Adventurer

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The cold war is not going the Kremlin's way either. Moscow seems no closer to grabbing Berlin; the U.S. is making a firm stand in Southeast Asia; Africa and other neutral areas are resisting Communist blandishments. Moreover, the Soviet effort to match the U.S. in advanced missile and nuclear hardware is painfully expensive, and still has not put Russia out in front. More and more of the American missile-carrying Polaris submarines are taking up underwater stations around the world, an effective seaborne answer to Russia's huge, costly intercontinental ballistic missiles.

How to redress the balance quickly, on the cheap? Although long-range ICBMs are too big and costly to mass produce, Russia's factories are geared to churn out the smaller medium-range and intermediate-range missiles. They must have seemed just right for Cuba, which is within easy range of the U.S., and hence potentially far more accurate than Russian-based missiles.

Dr. No Aspect. The haste with which Khrushchev grasped the opportunity and mounted his Cuban missile program tends to confirm the Washington theory that he hoped to have the weapons ready for some fancy nuclear blackmail with the U.S. this fall. At an estimated cost of $1 billion, the missiles were relatively inexpensive, but once they were in place, Moscow might at last sign the long-threatened peace treaty with East Germany and order the West out of Berlin. Considered now, in the light of its failure, the plan suggests a certain Dr. No aspect of the mad scientist threatening to blow up the U.S., but it also had a sort of classic simplicity.

Khrushchev must have considered the possibility of getting caught while the missiles were being installed, but apparently thought it worth the gamble. He evidently banked on U.S. acquiescence or, at least, confusion and hesitation. This was the major miscalculation. Only seven weeks ago he had boasted to Austria's Vice Chancellor, then visiting Moscow, that Russia would ignore any possible U.S. blockade of Cuba. But once he realized the possible cost of doing so, he acted with breathtaking speed.

Tug of War. Khrushchev was obviously afraid that if he hesitated the U.S. would invade Cuba or destroy the bases; a backdown after such action would be far more humiliating than a retreat before. For years to come, political scientists will be studying and restudying the rapid exchange of messages between the Kremlin and the White House, as Khrushchev tried to forestall U.S. action and salvage what he could.