Defense: The Dilemma & the Design

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Facing Facts. McNamara's strategy reflects his willingness to face fearful facts and counter them with his own cold logic. The U.S., contends McNamara, has a definite nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union (soon after taking office he impolitically dismissed the "missile gap" that Kennedy campaigned on in 1960). McNamara intends to maintain the advantage. Even if the Russians were to launch a surprise nuclear attack, the U.S., with its hardened missiles and its Strategic Air Command bombers—half of them now on 15-minute alert — could strike back and destroy the Soviet Union. But, reasons McNamara, as Russia builds up its own hard-site missile bases and missile-firing submarines, as it is now doing, the U.S. could "double and triple" its present force and still not be able to knock out all the Soviet weapons. Thus, "regardless of how large or what kind of strategic forces we build . . . we could not preclude casualties counted in the tens of millions."

To McNamara, such a "balance of terror" should constitute a "mutual deterrent" against war. Even if nuclear war were to explode, McNamara has a theory that it might be limited. To achieve this, he would in effect hold Soviet cities as hostages. That is, he would have the U.S. first respond to attack by striking only at Soviet missile sites and military installations; he would then serve an ultimatum to the enemy to quit shooting or suffer destruction of its cities.

McNamara is fully aware of the imponderables in the theory. "The Soviet leaders always say that they would strike at the entire complex of our military power, including Government and production centers, meaning our cities," he concedes. "If they were to do so, we would, of course, have no alternative but to retaliate in kind. But we have no way of knowing whether they would actually do so. It would certainly be in their interest as well as ours to try to limit the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange. Whether they would accept it [the alternative of trying to win without striking cities] in the crisis of a global nuclear war, no one can say. Considering what is at stake, we believe it is worth the additional effort on our part to have this option."

The shift in strategic thinking under McNamara boils down to an increased flexibility in how the U.S. might respond to whatever an enemy does. From nuclear warfare down to a jungle skirmish, it provides for McNamara's insistence upon "options." Under Eisenhower, the basic reliance was upon total nuclear retaliation.

McNamara presents his theories in a manner that others find not easy to argue with, for he has in his head all the facts and figures that led to the formulation of policy.* Every argument has been neatly organized, every problem "quantified," every solution tucked into a compartment to await its proper time to be applied. McNamara's speech bristles with the no-nonsense language of "controlled response," "second-strike capability" and "counterforce." Yet, despite the difficulty of refuting it, his strategy is highly controversial—and, despite his considerable abilities, Robert McNamara is a highly controversial Secretary of Defense.