Defense: The Dilemma & the Design

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McNamara gets that same glint in his eye when he talks about the "intellectually challenging, but militarily useless, engineering tour de force" of military research and development. "Poor planning, unrealistic schedules, unnecessary design changes, and enormous cost increases over original estimates have continuously disrupted the efficient operation of our program," he told Congress. "We want to do our thinking before we start bending metal. Pencils and paper are a lot cheaper than the termination of programs."

To achieve his aims will require every bit of McNamara's brilliance and dedication. His programs may run into political objections, at home and abroad, that compel compromises or retreats; if so, he expects to be in on the decisions. Along the way to his goals, he will injure plenty of feelings, but he has thought about that too. "I see my position here'" he says, "as being that of a leader, not a judge. I'm here to originate and stimulate new ideas and programs, not just to referee arguments and harmonize interests." In his cramped, left-handed script he will continue to pepper his military leaders with incessant questions: "Why? How much? What are the alternatives?" He regrets the fact that those military leaders so often disagree with his decisions. Explains one close associate: "If there were time, he could do more in the way of complete explanation of every decision. He believes that these people are devoting themselves to the defense of the country and they'd understand. But if you don't have time and the nation's security is at stake or great sums of money are being wasted, you move ahead." And to Robert McNamara, moving ahead is just about everything.