Bolivia: State of Anarchy

"So far as we can see," said a foreign diplomat in La Paz, "we are living in a state of anarchy." One week after President Victor Paz Estenssoro had been toppled by a military uprising, about the only thing General René Barrientos and his junta of colonels had proved was that it is easier to foment a revolution than to run a government.

Rioters had opened the jails, spilling hundreds of criminals onto the streets. A mob ransacked Paz Estenssoro's home so completely that even the toilets were carried away. The stories circulating about the ex-President verged on the ludicrous, among them that he had stolen four times the national budget in U.S. aid funds.

In the wake of it all, Barrientos seemed at a loss about what to do, or even where to start. He kept repeating his democratic ideals and desires for economic stability. "Bolivia," he insisted, "must keep particularly close relations with the U.S." He talked about disarming both the peasant militia of Paz Estenssoro and the militant tin min ers of Leftist Juan Lechín to avoid fur ther trouble. Yet he allowed Lechín to grab control of all the country's most important unions, bowed even further by promising the unions joint control with management in running the nationalized tin mines. In the past when the miners had such a voice, they featherbedded costs so high that Bolivia was no longer able to export tin at a profit.

In alarm, Washington suspended the U.S. aid program, which has pumped more than $300 million into Bolivia since 1952. The U.S. also purposefully delayed recognizing the new regime, though most observers felt that U.S. recognition was bound to come eventually.