Foreign Relations: The War Council

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Hour after hour for three days last week, President Johnson sat with top military, diplomatic, political and intelligence advisers in an extraordinary council of war.

Occasion for the sessions was the return from a five-day inspection trip to South Viet Nam of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler.

During that trip, McNamara received from both South Viet Nam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and the U.S. field commander, General William Westmoreland requests that the number of American troops in Viet Nam, now at about 75,000, be considerably increased. By jet, Jeep and helicopter, McNamara traveled the fighting fronts, talking with U.S. troops and getting on-the-scene briefings. He flew to the aircraft carrier Independence, patrolling 80 miles off the Vietnamese coast, watched jet bombers take off to attack North Viet Nam.

He visited the village of Le My, eight miles from the big U.S.-operated airbase at Danang, was told that Le My had been taken from the Viet Cong and turned into a model village. Some 400 Vietnamese who had been living under Viet Cong control have voluntarily moved to Le My.

Bad But Not Black. About to return to the U.S., McNamara told newsmen at Saigon airport that "in many aspects, there has been deterioration since I was here last, 15 months ago. The size of the Viet Cong forces has increased; their rate of operations and the intensity of their attacks have been expanded; their disruption of the lines of communication, both rail and sea and road, is much more extensive; and they have intensified their campaign of terror against the civilian population." He might have added that there is general recognition that even in the last few months the U.S. has made errors in Viet Nam that have resulted in the Viet Cong's gaining territory from which it may be difficult to dislodge them for a long while (see THE WORLD).

But, continued McNamara, the "picture is not all black." Behind that statement lay the fact that U.S. air strikes both in South Viet Nam and against North Viet Nam are definitely and visibly having effect. In the ground war, the Viet Cong are taking heavier casualties than the South Vietnamese government troops. Moreover, the Communists presumably know that they cannot achieve real victory until they occupy South Viet Nam's important population centers, and to do that, they must operate as large units. Yet any such move from terrorism and guerrilla warfare would render them vulnerable to superior American and South Vietnamese firepower.

Back in Washington only two hours, McNamara got an 8 a.m. phone call from President Johnson, who wanted his impressions about "some of the more obvious questions about Viet Nam." The President told him to organize his notes and send them to the White House for a quick reading before the first of the war-council sessions, scheduled for later that morning.

Among the major matters reviewed and discussed during the White House meetings that followed for the rest of the week: