Foreign Relations: The Credibility of Commitment

The war in Viet Nam far transcends Viet Nam. From the Rhine to the Mekong River, 42 nations of the free world have formal military alliances with the U.S. Each rests on Washington's pledge of physical protection. If that assurance has, after two decades, lost much of its immediacy for Western Europe, it is nevertheless an assurance that can not exist if it is half doubted and half believed. If the Pax Americana is to be credible anywhere, it must be credible everywhere.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out in Paris last week that the American commitment to South Viet Nam is indivisible from the American commitment to Western Europe's independence. In a forceful summation of all the free world's unlearned lessons over the past three decades, Rusk reminded NATO's Foreign Ministers at their year-end council meeting: "Ask yourself what your national interests are in the Viet Nam conflict. Ask yourself what were our interests in Manchuria in 1931 and in Ethiopia in 1936. Ask yourself what were your national interests as Hitler made his aggressive progress. In those days, we as governments did not recognize our national interests—and look at the price we paid."

Heavy Burdens. In practical, immediate terms, argued Rusk, "the group around this table has an enormous interest in how the U.S. meets its commitments in Viet Nam. If we don't meet those commitments, couldn't it lead the Communist capitals to feel they could undertake greater adventures elsewhere? And couldn't it lead Peking to claim that we do not react to provocation? If one commitment is not met in one place, ask yourself what other commitments elsewhere would mean. We will not ask the American people to neglect a commitment in one place and maintain one in another place. The American people will be called upon to bear heavy burdens in the corning year. The morale of the American people is high, and we will bear those burdens."

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara warned NATO that Red China will probably have medium-range ballistic missiles (range: 1,500 miles) by 1967 and intercontinental ballistic missiles (range: 5,500 miles) by 1975—thus making it possible for Red China to send nuclear weapons smashing into Western Europe. Recalling Defense Minister Lin Piao's arrogant boast that China's master strategy is to take over "the cities of the world," McNamara noted pointedly that the threat applies as much to Europe as to the U.S.