Europe: The Grandest Tour

(6 of 8)

Arm Twisting. Unfortunately for that slow and easy philosophy, reunification fever is at a higher pitch in West Germany today than at any time since the war. Triggered by the proposed Red-neraustausch (speakers' exchange) between West German Social Democrats and East German Communists tentatively set for July 14, the fever was further heated by Christian Democrat Rainer Barzel's sweeping proposals for reunification in his "Unity Day" speech in New York (TIME, June 24). Barzel's concessions for reunification included leaving Soviet troops within a reconstituted Germany as a protection of Soviet interests in the "northern tier" of Warsaw Pact nations. Barzel believes that even in a "neutralized" non-nuclear Germany, with a legal Communist Party and Soviet presence, West German wealth and pro-democratic institutions would ultimately triumph.

Barzel's propositions were merely an attempt to sweeten the pot for the Russians in their poker-face view of the European future. Yet troop presence remains at the very heart of Europe's past history and future development. Both of the world's two great powers have every reason to want their soldiers out of the frigid zones of occupation. In Paris last March, Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin announced: "The War saw Pact nations will either reduce their military forces or even abolish them if a corresponding move is undertaken by the NATO allies in West Europe." Moscow quickly quenched any flaming hopes over that issue by reiterating its hard line on the subject of Viet Nam, but still it was obvious that Zorin's bosses were floating a trial balloon.

Russia obviously has much to gain by restructuring the Warsaw Pact. Pressure is on from Moscow's allies—principally Rumania—to cut back on defense costs and remove Russian troops from East Germany, Hungary and Poland. After all, they have a way of discouraging nationalism. Nearly half of the Soviet ground force is currently stationed west of the Urals—where much less than half the danger to Russia now originates. The only hot war in the world is in the Far East, and Red China is still hungry for the Mongolian territory Russia claims as its own.

By contrast, the U.S. finds it equally expensive to maintain 225,000 men in Western Europe. Washington is perennially faced with the problem of offsetting the balance-of-payments deficit ($1.3 billion last year) that the troops generate, and must make up for it by selling weapons to its NATO allies. Recently, the Defense Department had to twist Bonn's arm to speed up payment on $675 million in reciprocal purchases.

Galling Years. But can the U.S. safely pull out of Europe now or in the future? Obviously not now, or at least not all at once. The pullback becomes a matter of pace—De Gaulle notwithstanding. Basic American policy remains firmly rooted in the strength of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO, France or no. The shibboleths of the past still permeate American policy. Under Secretary of State George Ball presents the hardline position of the State Department's "theologians" in terms right out of the deep freeze.