The Presidency: New Realism

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THE PRESIDENCY

The news from Viet Nam gave more reason for optimism than pessimism. As one Administration leader after another reported in recent weeks, the U.S. was gaining steadily on the battlefront. The Harris poll showed that the stepped-up bombing raids on Hanoi and Haiphong were endorsed by 5 out of every 6 Americans. And ratings of the President's own popularity, after hitting a nadir of 46% in May, had curved robustly upward (to 55% ). So why was Lyndon Johnson so out of sorts?

The reason was simply that the euphoria, in his view, was getting out of hand. And mindful of past occasions when rosy prognostications had ended in a nationwide letdown, the President decided last week that it was time to inject some sober realism into the mood.

"I Cannot Tell You." Though Johnson had himself discussed the war in encouraging terms of late, a White House aide sternly informed reporters that they had "misinterpreted" the President, "mistaking determination for optimism." To make doubly sure that the nation got his message, the President abruptly scheduled a speech before the American Alumni Council in White Sulphur Springs, W. Va. He could not make the trip because the weather closed in, so he made the speech over television from the White House instead.

Warning the American people that they must be prepared "to carry — perhaps for a long, long time — the burden of a confusing and costly war," Johnson said somberly that "we have a long way to journey" before the "shadow that hangs over all of Asia tonight will will begin to recede." Well, you say, 'When will that day come?' And I'm sorry to say I cannot tell you. Only the men in Hanoi can give you that answer. We are fighting a war of determination. It may last a long time." Addressing Hanoi, he declared: "Victory for your armies is impossible. You cannot drive us from South Viet Nam by force. Do not mistake our firm stand for false optimism; as long as you persist in aggression, we are going to resist."

Opening Minds. Johnson launched into a lengthy discussion of U.S. responsibility as a "Pacific power" in general and of American relations with Red China specifically. He said that the "essential for peace in Asia, which may seem the most difficult of all" will be to bring about a "reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies. A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia. A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside and toward policies of peaceful cooperation." Repeating the containment-without-isolation thesis expounded by his Administration recently, he said that "the greatest force for opening closed minds and opening closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods." Johnson concluded:

"We believe that cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th century."