The War: Future Indicative

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An Attempt to Embarrass. What the U.S. could lose by a bombing pause, military leaders point out, is the sustained, punishing impact of the daily harassment and destruction of the North's war machine. The University of London's P. J. Honey, an expert on North Viet Nam, believes the North is in dire need of just such a respite. Though no one is predicting the imminent collapse of Ho Chi Minh's regime, the North is obviously under severe strain. In the nearly three years since the bombings began, Honey says, there has been a marked erosion of morale among the North Vietnamese. "The people can see no letup as long as the bombing continues," he argues. "There are doubts about the prospects of defeating so great a power as the U.S. The bombing has brought this home. Some 500,000 North Vietnamese have been tied up rebuilding roads and bridges and keeping communications lines open. Another 200,000 are manning antiaircraft batteries, and a further 200,000 coolies are occupied in taking stuff to the South. This has created grave inroads into the manpower of the country. There is fear about sabotaging of plants and the spreading of defeatist rumors."

All the same, if Hanoi is serious about negotiations, says Honey, its contacts with Washington in various parts of the world are "good enough so as not to need to rely on what Outer Mongolians tell the A.F.P. This has the look to me of simply another attempt to embarrass the U.S. Government."

Driving a Wedge. Indeed, when North Viet Nam wants to sit down at the negotiating table, it can communicate its desire directly to the U.S. within a matter of hours from any number of world capitals. U.S. Ambassador to Burma Henry A. Byroade has been in frequent touch with North Vietnamese officials and could be reached at any time. So, too, could embassy personnel in Moscow, who also have had dealings with the North Vietnamese. Chester Bowles's visit to Pnompenh this week gives the North another opportunity for a high-level contact. If Hanoi does not want to confer directly with Washington, President Johnson has made it clear that he would favor informal talks between the N.L.F. and South Viet Nam. "The war can be stopped in a matter of days," Johnson has said—if talks start in earnest.

Washington would like to see Saigon probe the N.L.F. to ascertain whether there is any chance of driving a wedge between it and Hanoi—even though most high U.S. officials in Viet Nam believe that the North dominates the Viet Cong's political leadership. But South Vietnamese officials are so fear ful of a U.S. attempt to foist an N.L.F.-dominated coalition government on them that they have refused to consider any formal meetings. It is conceivable, suggested an observer, that the North is trying to drive its own wedge between Washington and Saigon.

Such fears could be easily overcome, of course, by a candid explanation of their intentions by the Communists. Lacking that, the U.S. seems to have little choice but to continue to question and requestion every move by Hanoi—and then to proceed as cautiously as it was doing last week.