Nation: In Pueblo's Wake

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Even if aircraft had been available, however, Washington officials question whether it would have been wise to send them to Pueblo's aid. The hijack was evidently well planned, and it was quite possible that an ambush awaited any rescue force; at Wonsan perched 50 to 100 MIGS, and South Korean intelligence spotted two additional Communist squadrons flying near the DMZ about the time of Pueblo's capture. Further, in towing Pueblo into Wonsan, the Koreans sailed in close formation, which would have made it difficult for a strafing plane to avoid killing Americans. Once in Wonsan, the six U.S. officers were met by Defense Minister Kim Chang Bong, who flew back with them to Pyongyang, the capital.

All the same, the failure to extricate Pueblo is riddled with ironies and grievous shortcomings. For so risky an action as a strafing run on North Korean vessels, the President's approval would have been needed. But Johnson was asleep, unaware of the situation until his advisers finally tipped him off a full 2 hrs. and 15 min. after Pueblo had been boarded. Even if the chain of communication had been less sluggish and reached Johnson in time for him to approve an air strike, his O.K. would have meant nothing. The world's foremost airpower did not have the retaliatory capacity ready in the right place to do the job.

Johnson's chief concern, as a result, was how to respond ex post facto without renewing the Korean War and forcing the U.S. to open a second front on the Asian mainland.

The President went into his crisis routine, meeting Rostow, conferring by telephone with Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. The first afternoon of the crisis, an informal "Planning Committee"-reminiscent of the Executive Committee (ExComm) set up under President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962—began to emerge. It included Rusk, McNamara, Helms, Rostow, Press Secretary George Christian, UnderSecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sam Berger, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke.

Johnson, disturbed by the heat and depth of Congress' reaction, set about trying to calm it down. Meeting with key congressional experts on foreign af fairs and atomic energy at the White House, he emphasized the need to take a calm approach and give diplomacy every opportunity to work. And if it did not? Nobody was willing to guess just what would happen.

War Maniac. Determined to show that the U.S. means business, the Planning Committee endorsed McNamara's suggestion for a limited call-up of air units, and decided to take the matter to the United Nations. Johnson also appeared on a nationwide TV hookup to explain the Reserve mobilization—as had Kennedy when he called up the Reserves for the 1961 Berlin confrontation and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In a somber three-minute talk delivered hurriedly and rather flatly, he pledged that "we shall continue to use every means available to find a prompt and peaceful solution." But he also called the seizure of the ship a "wanton and aggressive act" and added, tightlipped: "Clearly, this cannot be accepted."