The War: The General's Biggest Battle

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No single battle of the Viet Nam war has held Washington — and the nation — in such complete thrall as has the impending struggle for Khe Sanh. Nor was the mood last week one of cockiness, even in official quarters. The forward outpost of Lang Vei was already lost—ground down under the treads of Soviet tanks. Nearly two weeks after the Communists staged their well-timed attacks against the South's major cities at a reported cost to them of 27,706 dead, U.S. intelligence officers were ominously warning that the chances of a second wave of assaults were "50-50."

Inevitably, a new wave of criticism washed over the Capital—and for the first time a good deal of it spilled onto General William C. West moreland, the handsome U.S. commander in Viet Nam for nearly four years. Some of the criticism was aimed at his consistently sanguine estimates of a struggle that has grown increasingly sanguinary. But more was directed at the over all strategy and conduct of the war.

Time for Truth. At a book-and-author luncheon in Chicago, New York's Democratic Senator Robert F. Kennedy mounted the harshest of the attacks. "It is time for the truth," said Kennedy. "It is time to face the reality that a military victory is not in sight and that it probably never will come." Agreed Bobby's senior colleague, Jacob Javits, in a Senate speech: "We do not yet have a winning strategy in Viet Nam. The situation there is basically stalemated." Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield likewise called for a major reassessment of the U.S. commitment. And in an emotional indictment of American conduct in the war, which admittedly ignored Communist atrocities, 29 Protestant, Catholic and Jewish clergymen published a 420-page catalogue of "U.S. war crimes," called In the Name of America.

Washington and Westmoreland were by no means the only targets. The South Vietnamese government was blasted for apathy, corruption and incompetence—though U.S. officials claimed that President Nguyen Van Thieu's administration acted creditably during the Communist attacks. Massachusetts' Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, fresh from a visit to Saigon, warned that if the Vietnamese "are unwilling to accept their responsibilities, then the American people, with great justification, may well consider their responsibilities fulfilled." Taking up his brother's theme, Bobby Kennedy told his Chicago audience: "Enormous corruption pervades every level of South Vietnamese official life." Washington's Democratic Senator Henry Jackson, a staunch Johnson supporter, demanded that "the Saigon government get off its duff and get moving."

Limited Leverage. Nothing, naturally, would please the Johnson Administration more. The fact is, however, that unless the U.S. wants to undertake a full-fledged colonial venture in South Viet Nam, its leverage in dealing with an independent and touchy Saigon government is severely limited. Militarily, too, U.S. options are notably restricted.