The War: Changing of the Guard

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Even as Washington and Hanoi conducted the delicate diplomatic exchanges that could lead to negotiations, the U.S. last week announced a major shift in the strategy of the Viet Nam war and named a new commander to carry it out. The strategy, set forth in his first press conference by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, is a decision by the U.S. to turn the war gradually over to the South Vietnamese and to give them the firepower and backing to wage it effectively. The new man in Viet Nam is General Creighton W. ("Abe") Abrams, 53, who will succeed General William C. West moreland, soon to return to Washington as Army Chief of Staff.

For the new task and role of the U.S. in Viet Nam, Abe Abrams' appointment represents a rare mating of man and mission. As Westmoreland's deputy commander, Abrams has spent the past ten months working with ARVN (the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam) to shape up its structure, stiffen its spine and improve its performance. In their extremely violent Jet offensive, the Communists unwittingly showed that Abrams has had some success: to the surprise of many Americans and the consternation of the Communists, ARVN bore the brunt of the early fighting with bravery and elan, performing better than almost anyone would have expected.

Their War. The notion that the South Vietnamese must ultimately take responsibility for their own defense is hardly new. To John F. Kennedy, it was an article of faith that he repeated often: "It is their war and they will have to win it." But the fact is that for the past three years, U.S. troops have taken charge of the war, making virtual wards of the South Vietnamese and consigning a third of them to pacification guard duty. That strategy was originally built on the assumption that the massive infusion of half a million American fighting men would enable the allies to win a clear-cut victory over the invading North Vietnamese and decimate the indigenous Viet Cong.

The reason for the shift in emphasis back to ARVN is that Hanoi has proved able to match the U.S. buildup through proportionate infiltration into the South, and that President Johnson has concluded that total military victory in Viet Nam is not possible at an acceptable cost in men or years. The result is a fundamental decision, reached in the past several weeks during a post-Tet "A to Z" reappraisal of the war by the Administration, to get the South Vietnamese ready to fend for themselves, as they would have had to do sooner or later. The decision was made possible by the improving ARVN itself, and by President Nguyen Van Thieu's recent general mobilization of Vietnamese men between 18 and 40, which will eventually create an ARVN of some 900,000 men.

President Johnson's decision to authorize only 24,500 more Americans for Viet Nam, rather than the 135,000 to 200,000 that Westmoreland had wanted, thus represents a tacit de-escalation of the war by the U.S. Since Lyndon Johnson has no intention of handing over South Viet Nam to the Communists, the new strategy depends on ARVN's ability to learn to fill the combat boots now being worn by the U.S.