World: Assessing the Bombing

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The problem with all these arguments is that the only practical way to test their validity is to stop the bombing. Supporters of a halt argue that an effort to get meaningful peace talks under way would be worth the military risks. There is no proof, they say, that allied forces would be unduly endangered or that the North Vietnamese would at once use a break to step up infiltration. No one really knows how Hanoi would react; the margin of ignorance in Washington about North Viet Nam and its intentions remains considerably larger than the core of knowledge. If the Communists did take advantage of a halt by shuttling heavy artillery close to the DMZ, allied troops could conceivably shunt a few miles to the south, out of range; indeed, contingency plans exist for such a move.

Politically, a halt would put Hanoi on the defensive. World opinion, for what it is worth, would back Ambassador Averell Harriman in pressing for a concession from Hanoi. A halt would also assuage U.S. domestic divisions over the war, so bitterly exposed in the fight over the Viet Nam plank in the Democratic Party's platform two weeks ago in Chicago. It might also boost the U.S. in its attempt to persuade Moscow, which provides Hanoi with the bulk of its hardware, to give a helping hand with the North Vietnamese. The Soviets have long made it clear that they could do nothing so long as the bombing continued.

The U.S. could always resume the bombing if Hanoi failed to respond to a halt, though Washington worries that U.S. and world opinion would make a resumption difficult. In any case, North Viet Nam does not provide the only target area against infiltration. Since the bulk of North Vietnamese replacements and equipment still pours south via the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, Washington could conceivably compensate for a bombing halt in the North by stepping up the air campaign over Laos. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford told the National Press Club last week that since the U.S. had limited its aircraft to the panhandle last March 31, the bombing had actually become more effective. Targets are easier to find and pilots have become better acquainted with their smaller area of operations. Presumably the same argument could be applied to an even narrower target area consisting of a portion of Laos or the border areas of South Viet Nam.

There are those who argue that the Administration might find it eminently worthwhile to return to the original concept behind the bombing campaign in the North. It was once conceived to be an on-off affair consisting of a period of bombing, then a pause to sniff the political wind, then a new round of strikes if there was no reaction from the other side. Under this concept, the U.S. could halt the bombing long enough to see if Hanoi would reciprocate, then start again if it did not. Short of a complete bombing halt, that could be the most acceptable strategy to try to get the Paris talks and the war off dead center.