Arms Control: What Can SALT Halt?

"Nuclear stalemate" is a phrase frequently used to describe the equation of the U.S. and Soviet Russia. The fact is that it is not truly a stalemate but a competition. To curb that competition and to establish an agreed-upon balance of destructive power have long been elusive hopes. In his Inaugural Address in January, the President declared: "With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms." For a long time, it seemed, the right people were not willing. After confidently predicting that U.S.-Soviet talks to limit arms would begin in August, the Administration heard mostly a series of hints, evasions and half-promises from Moscow. Finally, last week, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin paid a secret visit to the White House and informed Nixon that Moscow was ready to open preliminary discussions Nov. 17 in Helsinki.

The negotiations are bound to popularize yet another weird acronym —SALT, for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The first round of sessions, lasting perhaps only a few weeks, will concentrate not on real issues but primarily on setting an agenda and other preliminaries. If neither side makes unreasonable demands, substantive bargaining could begin soon afterward. Despite the belated Russian response, Secretary of State William Rogers terms the Soviets "serious" in their desire to negotiate. There is reason to hope, then, that the tedium of setting up ground rules will be kept to a minimum and that the Helsinki talks really signal what Rogers calls "possibly the most important negotiations that we will be involved in." Even partial success could yield a more significant Soviet-American agreement than the 1963 limited ban on nuclear testing.

Verification Problem. The fundamental purpose of SALT, of course, is for the U.S. and Russia to agree on a freeze or even a reduction in such enormously expensive weapons systems as anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and new, multiheaded offensive missiles (MIRV). The necessity for both sides to verify mutually agreed cuts or halts in weapons production will involve discussion of tremendous technical problems. What each side will be bargaining about, moreover, is the vital protective shield of its society. For both of these reasons, progress in SALT is not likely to pour out quickly.

The one practical cause for hope is the desire on both sides to cut military weapons expenditures. Billions for new nuclear armaments not only divert funds from other needs, but are soon vitiated as each side keeps pace with the other. As the talks open, both Russia and the U.S. are mid-course in the development of ABM and MIRV — and the hardest, most suspicion-ridden bargaining of the sessions will center on them. The defensive ABM complex, which is already operational around Moscow, is due to be installed in twelve widely scattered U.S. sites. MIRV (for multiple individually targeted re-entry vehicle) permits a single launcher to deliver separate nuclear warheads on various targets. This device could be operational in the U.S. in about a year, probably ahead of the Russian version.