Americans on the War Divided, Glum, Unwilling to uit

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The leadership also rejected, by a margin of 72% to 20%, the idea that antiwar sentiment is playing too large a part in Nixon's war decisions. The public agreed with the leaders by a margin of 49% to 35%. Majorities of both the public and the leaders felt that the tragedy of the war was that it had divided the American people and agreed that it should be ended because it has kept the country from doing more about its domestic problems. "It's drained too many resources from this country—its manpower, its leadership, its resources," said Isaac Young, mayor of Olivette, Mo. "It's set this country back many years in solving its own problems."

No Illusions About Saigon

Angered by the intransigence of South Viet Nam's leaders and shocked by tales of graft and corruption, Americans seem to be losing the good will they once felt for their ally. By 42% to 21%, respondents said that the South Vietnamese government has hindered rather than helped the U.S. in its search for peace. The leadership group went the same way, 55% to 20%. Neither the leaders nor the public expressed any illusions about freedom in North Viet Nam, and both agreed that the Hanoi government commands more loyalty from its citizens than the Saigon regime. Said Ralph Comfortes of Los Angeles: "We are supporting a government that has no support from the Buddhists. We don't have the support of the Viet peasant."

Sixty-four percent of the public and 74% of the leaders favored replacing the Thieu government with one more representative of the South Vietnamese people. However, the public found itself nearly evenly divided when asked if it thought that the South Vietnamese army would fight better under a new government, while only a small plurality of the leaders felt it would.

What are acceptable settlement terms?

American attitudes toward the South Vietnamese government have had a profound influence on the type of settlement the country is willing to accept to end the war. While 55% of the leaders and 58% of the public voiced support of the President in maintaining that South Viet Nam's right of self-determination is not negotiable, those polled showed great flexibility on the meaning of the term.

The public would accept a neutralist government, committed neither to the U.S. nor the Communists, by a 71% to 12% margin. However, the public is willing, by 47% to 26%, to sacrifice the present Saigon government if that is the only way to peace, while the leaders, 62% to 22%, are even more agreeable to the idea. The partitioning of South Viet Nam, under which the Viet Cong would rule those parts of the country it controlled and the Saigon government the rest, is supported by a 42% to 29% margin among the people and 53% to 33% among the leaders.

But on the question of whether Communists should be allowed into a new South Vietnamese government, the public and the leaders parted ways decisively. The public opposed letting the Communists into the government 49% to 33%; the leaders favored such a compromise 62% to 28%. The public also rejected a government with a Communist majority 62% to 21%. The leaders split, 44% in favor, 45% opposed.

Nixon's Dilemma