THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PEACE IN VIET NAM

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substantially reduced the scale of the war—officials stress that lowering the pressure did not result in an increase in the negotiating pace.

The Limits of Action

Whatever route the President elects, he will soon be confronted with revoking Laird's statement that 1969 is too early to contemplate any U.S. troop reductions. It should not be too difficult for Nixon to manage. By ordering the withdrawal of a relatively modest 15,000 combat troops plus their 25,000 support troops in the latter half of 1969, Nixon could manage to bring home 40,000 men. If nothing else, such a decision would at least buy him a concession from Hanoi (if the withdrawal were negotiated) and certainly, as the South Vietnamese watched the first layer of their U.S. insulation stripped away, a new sense of urgency on the part of Saigon.

Essentially, what is at issue in these debates is tactics, or the specific actions that will lead to the war's end. For all its mounting pressure and potential fury, the most striking thing about the present debate is the agreement by all participants that the war in Viet Nam must be brought to an end well short of any outright allied military victory. Beyond that, there is unanimous acceptance of the conclusion that the U.S. involvement in the war—sooner rather than later—must begin to dwindle. Though he can still choose his own methods, Nixon must operate inside those perimeters, the limits defined by the American people in the tumultuous political year of 1968.