THE CHINESE BLINKED

FOR much of 1969, the threat of a major conflict hovered over the 4,500-mile frontier between the Soviet Union and China. In at least two all-out battles this year on the Ussuri and Amur rivers, which separate Siberia and Manchuria, the Soviets called in armor and heavy artillery to pound the Chinese. Tensions rose to the point where the Soviets hinted that they might even launch a preventive strike against China's nuclear installations unless Peking agreed to negotiations aimed at settling the conflict. The war of nerves was threatening to get out of hand. Last week, after months of trying to face down the stronger Soviets, the Chinese blinked first.

In a dramatic retreat from IBP past intransigence, Peking agreed to discuss the border issue with the Soviets. At the same time, the Chinese urged that troops massed along the border be pulled back and that no force be used. They also expressed the hope that relations between the two governments could be normalized, despite the nine-year-old ideological rift that has separated them (see box, following page).

No Intimidation. As usual, the Chinese seasoned their basically conciliatory statement with a bit of bluster. "China will never be intimidated by war threats, including nuclear war threats," Peking warned. "Should a handful of war maniacs dare to raid China's strategic sites in defiance of world condemnation, that will be war."

Even so, Peking said, there was "no reason whatsoever for China and the Soviet Union to fight a war over the boundary question." The Chinese even referred to "peaceful coexistence," an abrupt about-face after all their talk of "overthrowing the Soviet revisionist renegade clique." Another apparent softening on the part of the Chinese was their expression of willingness to negotiate on the basis of frontier treaties that Peking considers "unequal" because they were imposed by czarist Russia on a tottering Chinese empire.

Superior Power. What caused Peking's retreat? Most Western analysts were certain that the Chinese backed down out of fear. Moscow's hints of preventive nuclear strikes finally convinced at least one faction of Peking's leadership that the Russians meant business and the time had come to face reality and yield before superior Soviet power. Another possibility, of course, was that the Chinese were simply buying time to get through a highly dangerous phase in the conflict and stop the shooting. That would be in line with one of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's dictums: "In defense, the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time, defense is a means of supplementing attack." The approach suggested flexibility rather than moderation.

Pressures for a more flexible policy probably began building in Peking in late August, 1968, when the Soviets shocked the Chinese with their effortless crackdown on Czechoslovakia. Hundreds of minor border clashes with the Soviets and a few major ones since last spring deepened Peking's anxiety.