Another Missile Gap?

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Even if that is so, there may be other hazards in the way of arms-limitation agreement. Professors George Rathjens and George Kistiakowsky, both former U.S. Government advisers, argued in a recent paper that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. differ so substantially in their basic defense assumptions that they will have grave difficulty finding common ground when SALT starts. U.S. and Soviet military doctrines diverge on the fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive forces—a critical point, since SALT will be concerned mainly with offensive weapons. Thus, they concluded, "it may not be possible to negotiate any meaningful limitations on strategic forces at all."

From all indications, the opening scene of SALT in Helsinki will be a cautious pas de deux in which both diplomatic dancers will try to learn new steps and explore each other's aims and interests as much as possible. That alone may be an accomplishment; it has taken years for the U.S. and the Soviet Union merely to sit down together and confront the overwhelming question of putting some kind of mutually agreed restraints on the nuclear arms race.

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If the Pentagon last week was spreading doubt about the wisdom of cutting back on the U.S. nuclear striking force, there was at the same time clear evidence that the Administration concepts of general strategy, immediate and long-range, are being reduced to more modest proportions. The broad outlines of this new approach are emerging from a nine-month study led by Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard. His report, known in the Pentagon as "Strategy Memorandum Number Three," embodies what Packard terms "a shrinkage" of military resources.

It recommends that U.S. forces of the future need not be prepared to wage a massive land war in Asia, and should remain a Pacific power only through air and naval strength. The only extensive foreign presence of U.S. ground troops would be in Europe, to meet NATO commitments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be required to plan for a major war there and a brush-fire engagement elsewhere—the so-called "1½-war" strategy—rather than for major actions in both Europe and Asia. No plans for full-scale military operations in Africa or Latin America would be considered.