LOW PROFILE IN LATIN AMERICA

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Nixon's initial prescriptions for a better partnership proved to be considerably less sweeping than many Latin Americans had hoped for. In part, his options were limited by congressional economizers. Only two days before his speech, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had axed $100 million from the President's $437.5 million request for the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, Nixon was certain to come under fire from liberals—at home and abroad—because of his pragmatic assessment of U.S. relations with the military regimes that now rule more than half of Latin America's 260 million people. In view of the "enormous, sometimes explosive forces for change," he said, "we must deal realistically with governments in the inter-American system as they are.

We have, of course, a preference for democratic procedure." That was a significant departure from the attitude of active disdain for Latin American dictators adopted by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

"I offer no grandiose promises and no panaceas," said Nixon. What he did offer was:

> To raise the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the rank of Under Secretary, with authority to coordinate the welter of U.S. Government activities concerning Latin America, thereby curtailing bureaucratic delays.

> To loosen restrictions on U.S. loans to Latin American nations. In the past, such aid has been "tied," meaning that

it had to be used to buy items made in the U.S. As of now, recipients will be able to spend the money not only in the U.S. but throughout Latin America as well. Trouble is, most of the Latin American nations would also like to be able to go to Europe and Japan for some of their purchases.

— To channel more development funds through a multilateral inter-American agency and to invite Latin American reviews of U.S. economic policies. In the past, bilateral aid agreements have invited charges of political string-pulling and economic intervention.

> To reduce nontariff barriers to trade maintained by nearly all industrialized countries, including the U.S. As it is, while the U.S. has encouraged economic diversification in Latin America, it has also imposed barriers against imports from the area. Under Nixon's proposed liberalization, the U.S. might conceivably increase its quotas on sugar or on such processed primary products as textiles—provided, of course, that stiff congressional resistance to such proposals can be surmounted.