Foreign Relations: Attacks !n Retaliation

The price of war in Viet Nam went up sharply last weekend: in retaliation against Communist guerilla raids which killed eight Americans and wounded more than 100, President Johnson ordered joint U.S. and South Vietnamese jet aircraft attacks on barracks and staging areas in the southern part of North Viet Nam.

Tensions had been rising all week, set off in part by the President's hasty dispatch of his top White House foreign relations advisor, McGeorge Bundy, to Saigon. Bundy's trip inevitably stirred speculation that the U.S. might be planning to expand the Vietnamese war, or, since the Bundy mission coincided with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's visit to Hanoi (see THE WORLD), that the U.S. and the Communists were entering into negotiations. The President sharply and convincingly knocked down that idea—both with words and, at week's end, action.

Less than Enthusiastic. The Bundy mission also sparked speculation that Maxwell Taylors days as U.S. ambassador to South Viet Nam are numbered. Taylor, of course, has been feuding openly with South Viet Nam's current leader, General Nguyen Khanh. Only last December President Johnson confided to an associate that he thought Taylor's tour of duty in Saigon might well end this spring: Taylor, he explained, has served the U.S. for many years, is tired, and wants a rest. Ironically enough, the deteriorating situation in Viet Nam has probably lengthened Taylor's tenure. For Johnson to recall him while he is under fire both at home and abroad would be a sore embarrassment.

In fact, Taylor himself suggested the Bundy trip. It has become customary for the ambassador to return to Washington for consultations every couple of months. But with South Viet Nam in its present chaotic condition, Taylor felt that he should stick to his post (the last time he left, last fortnight on a trip to Laos, another Saigon government was thrown out of office). The ambassador even sent to Washington a memorandum listing some 20 points that he hoped to discuss at length with Bundy; they ranged from whether Taylor should fly to Washington to brief Congress some time soon to the paramount question of whether the U.S. should extend, and possibly escalate, the Vietnamese war.

That made quite an agenda, and shortly after Bundy arrived in Saigon he plunged into a nine-hour session with Taylor and other U.S. diplomatic and military officials. Taylor told him flatly that until the South Vietnamese government is stabilized, it would be disastrous for the U.S. to launch more aggressive tactics and strategy.

As does every U.S. visitor to Saigon, Bundy met with frustrations. He particularly wanted to meet with Khanh, but their first scheduled session was canceled when Bundy received orders to stand by for a priority message (nature unspecified) from the White House. The two were also supposed to meet at a U.S.-sponsored reception; Khanh sent regrets. Bundy finally did manage to spend an hour with Khanh. What they said to each other remains unknown, but Bundy emerged looking less than enthusiastic. He also met with Khanh's Acting Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Oanh and Chief of State Phan Khac Suu.